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DRONES AND DATA: A LIMITED IMPACT ON PRIVACY
David Sella-Villa *
INTRODUCTION
Concerns about drones and their impact on privacy are misplaced. Most of the scenarios discussed in the academic literature
and policy commentary simply assume that drones operate in a
unique way. These discussions of drones and privacy have left the
antecedent question unexamined—precisely how do drones impact
privacy? This Article is the first to clearly define the operational
parameters of drones that impact privacy in a unique way. From
this precise definition, we learn that drones operate in very few
spaces that allow them to capture data inaccessible to other technologies. In short, how drones operate has a limited impact on privacy.
Drones, however, are primarily data collection devices. By tracing the flow of data into and from a drone, it becomes clear that
many parties potentially have access to drone-captured data. The
privacy impact of drones, therefore, must be understood in the light
of the third-party doctrine. Once a drone captures data about a person, that person has almost no recourse to prevent its sharing and
distribution.
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Drones have also stirred the emotions of legislators. Hundreds
of provisions in state and local laws purport to address the privacy
concerns presented by drones and their data. This Article analyzes
these laws and demonstrates that very few actually address the
unique privacy impact of drones and their data flow. Furthermore,
these laws interact with the third-party doctrine in a manner that
mutes almost all privacy protections. Concerns about the privacy
impact of drones, therefore, should focus on either limiting data
capture by drones or changing the U.S. privacy doctrines.
I. DESCRIBING THE DRONE PRIVACY PROBLEM PRECISELY
Many scholars and commentators have sought to link the fears
inspired by drone usage with legal conceptions of privacy. Some
have looked to the emotions stirred by drones to catalyze broad
changes to U.S. privacy protections.1 Others assume the ubiquity
of drone operations2 and suggest “drone operation[s] [may] destroy[] society’s privacy expectations to the degree that individuals
have no reasonable expectation of privacy from drone surveillance.”3 Military drone technologies that are yet to be widely de-

1. M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 30–31
(2011); accord Amanda Miller, Privacy Issues from Above: Hobbyist Drone Use and the Need
for a Model Act, 34 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 343, 345 (2018).
2. Joseph J. Vacek, Remote Sensing of Private Data by Drones Is Mostly Unregulated:
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Are at Risk Absent Comprehensive Federal Legislation,
90 N.D. L. REV. 463, 465 (2014); Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky and Privacy Concerns on
the Ground, ABA SCITECH LAW., Summer 2015, at 6, 9; Colonel Dawn M.K. Zoldi et al.,
States Rights . . . Or Just Wrong? A Discussion of Drone Laws and National Security
Through the Lens of Federal Pre-Emption, 4 NAT’L SECURITY L.J. 168, 169 (2016); Stephen
J. Migala, UAS: Understanding the Airspace of States, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 6 (2017);
Melissa Barbee, Comment, Uncharted Territory: The FAA and the Regulation of Privacy Via
Rulemaking for Domestic Drones, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 487 (2014); Ben Jenkins, Note,
Watching the Watchmen: Drone Privacy and the Need for Oversight, 102 KY. L.J. 161, 181
(2013); William J. Black III, Comment, A No-Drones Home: Solving the Home Airspace Dilemma, 11 J. MARSHALL L.J. 1, 58 (2017); David M. Remillard, Comment, Highway to the
Danger Drone: Reconciling First Amendment Rights of Drone Owners and Privacy Rights of
Individuals in Creating a Comprehensive Statutory Scheme in Rhode Island, 22 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 640, 640 (2017).
3. Chris Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones Continues
to Erode Our Concept of Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 15
(2013); accord Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They
Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 57–58 (2013); Daniel Friedenzohn & Mike Branum, Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities for States and
Local Governments, 10 FLA. L. REV. 389, 391 (2015); Rebecca L. Scharf, Game of Drones:
Rolling the Dice with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Privacy, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 457, 461;
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ployed in U.S. civilian contexts have inspired assertions that government agencies can “watch a person’s movements to and from
his or her home at all hours of the day and night without the chance
of detection.”4
The scenarios described by others simply assume that drones operate in a unique way. Drones, however, are not truly a unique
technology. Drones are simply an amalgam of technologies that the
Supreme Court has already analyzed for their impact on privacy.5
In one sense, drones are simply aircraft.6 The radio controls used
to operate them can still be found in drones’ progeny—model aircraft.7 But because they are unmanned, drones typically come
equipped with cameras to allow the operator to see where it is flying.8 Manned aircraft, and even satellites, have cameras.9 Cameras
are not new—Warren and Brandeis warned about the privacy invading qualities of cameras in the 1890s.10 Drones, therefore, could
be no different than any other camera-equipped technology. If a
Jonathan Olivito, Note, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: Limiting Drone Surveillance
Through the Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 675 (2013).
4. Victoria T. San Pedro, Note, Drone Legislation: Keeping an Eye on Law Enforcement’s Latest Surveillance Technology, 43 STETSON L. REV. 679, 713 (2014); Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 7 (2014); Taly Matiteyahu, Note, Drone Regulations and
Fourth Amendment Rights: The Interaction of State Drone Statutes and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265, 273 (2015). But see Jesse Marx,
We’re Suing to Learn More About the Drone Test Project Hitting San Diego Skies, VOICE SAN
DIEGO (June 1, 2020, 2:08 PM), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/news/were-suing-tolearn-more-about-the-drone-test-project-hitting-san-diego-skies/ [https://perma.cc/5UBV-4
69X]; Joseph Trevithick, Customs and Border Protection Reaper Drone Appears over Minneapolis Protests, DRIVE (May 29, 2020), https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33756/cust
oms-and-border-protection-predator-b-drone-appears-over-minneapolis-protests
[https://
perma.cc/ARQ3-YB65]; contra Luke Barr, Drones Deployed During Marches Were Not to Spy
on Protesters: Authorities, ABC NEWS (June 10, 2020, 4:03 AM), https://abcnews.go.com
/US/drones-deployed-marches-spy-protesters-authorities/story?id=71165057 [https://perm
a.cc/3S2T-AJCF]; Matthew Gault, Arizona Cops Use Drone Surveillance to Arrest Protestors,
VICE (June 30, 2020, 10:19 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5dzdeq/arizona-copsuse-drone-surveillance-to-arrest-protesters [https://perma.cc/RZ9N-Z66T] (“While many police departments have their own drones, there have been very few drone-aided arrests in
the United States.”).
5. Scharf, supra note 3, at 460.
6. Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730, at 4–8 (Nov. 17, 2014),
https://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/5730.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX8H-SKXM].
7. Joseph J. Vacek, The Next Frontier in Drone Law: Liability for Cybersecurity Negligence and Data Breaches for UAS Operators, 39 CAMPBELL L. REV. 135, 139 (2017).
8. Farber, supra note 4, at 12.
9. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890).
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photo is taken, from a privacy perspective, the platform taking the
photo could well be irrelevant. Why then so much concern about
drones’ impact on privacy?
Concededly, it makes intuitive sense that drones are different
from other technologies. A few have hinted at the precise answer
as to exactly how drones are different. John Villasenor, in his seminal piece on drone privacy, described a scenario where “a UAS,
hovering in a backyard and taking pictures through a window . . .
acquire[s] images that might show an occupant of the house in a
state of undress.”11 Michel and Gettinger noted that “[m]any worry
that small camera-equipped unmanned aircraft could enable users
to fly over or near private property and record data that would not
have been accessible by other means.”12
Drones are distinct from manned aircraft because of their combination of minimum safe altitude of lawful operations, maneuverability, required training, operator intent, and detectability.13 The
images captured by drones can be distinguished from the capabilities of observers on the ground, manned aerial photography, satellites, and even a neighbor’s elevated vantage points.14 This Article
is the first to show that the net impact of these distinguishing characteristics, however, proves to be rather limited.
The flight capabilities of drones have drawn the attention of
many privacy commentators.15 But if the unique operational parameters of drones are rather limited, then what feature of drones
justifies the claims of significant privacy impacts? This Article uses
a definition of drones that emphasizes their most salient feature—
drones are primarily data collection devices.
Building on the work of Joseph Vacek, this Article traces how
data flows to and from drones.16 The data captured by drones includes images and information about data subjects other than the
11. John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 498 (2013).
12. ARTHUR HOLLAND MICHEL & DAN GETTINGER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE
AT BARD COLL., DRONE INCIDENTS: A SURVEY OF LEGAL CASES 2 (2017), https://dronecenter.
bard.edu/files/2017/04/CSD-Drone-Incidents.pdf [https://perma.cc/727P-B2EL].
13. See infra section III.A.
14. See infra section III.B.
15. See, e.g., supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text; infra note 42 and accompanying
text.
16. See Vacek, supra note 7.
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drone operator. Drone software programs nearly automatically
share drone-captured data with the drone software provider.17
Drone-captured data, therefore, becomes a business record of the
drone software provider—a third party.18 Once the data becomes a
business record of a drone software provider, the third-party doctrine effectively prevents a data subject from stopping the distribution, sharing, or sale of that data with others.
Even without clearly defining how drones can impact privacy,
the legislative urge to address privacy issues presented by drones
has been strong.19 The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)

17. Privacy Policy, PARROT, https://www.parrot.com/global/privacy-policy [https://perm
a.cc/C34S-G96N] (last updated July 9, 2020) (detailing how images are shared in conjunction with a social media profile); DJI Privacy Policy, DJI, https://www.dji.com/policy
[https://perma.cc/FTU7-UZKY] (last updated Jan. 1, 2020) (discussing the SkyPixel image
sharing forum); see also Maggie Miller, DOJ Bans Use of Grant Funds for Certain ForeignMade Drones, HILL (Oct. 8, 2020, 5:11 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/520269justice-department-issues-policy-banning-use-of-grant-funds-for-certain [https://perma.cc/
FK8N-S2SP]; Paul Mozur, Drone Maker D.J.I. May Be Sending Data to China, U.S. Officials
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/technology/dji-chinadata-drones.html [https://perma.cc/E79S-N7VV]; David McCabe, U.S. Divided over Chinese
Drone Bans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/technology/uschina-drone-ban.html [https://perma.cc/UDG9-D63F]; Dawn M.K. Zoldi, DJI Is Blacklisted:
Whopper or Nothing Burger?, INSIDE UNMANNED SYS. (Dec. 21, 2020), https://insideunman
nedsystems.com/dji-is-blacklisted-whopper-or-nothing-burger/ [https://perma.cc/NX5V-BZ
UK]; Haye Kesteloo, DJI’s Official Response to DHS Alert: Your Data Is Not Our Business,
DRONEDJ (May 23, 2019, 11:31 AM), https://dronedj.com/2019/05/23/dji-official-responsedhs-alert/ [https://perma.cc/RE9P-4JHE]; Haye Kesteloo, Security Researcher Exposes DJI
Customer Data, Walks Away From $30k Bug Bounty and Posts His Story Online, DRONEDJ
(Nov. 20, 2017, 11:57 PM), https://dronedj.com/2017/11/20/security-researcher-exposes-djicustomer-data-walks-away-from-30k-bug-bounty-and-posts-his-story-online/ [https://perm
a.cc/FTU7-UZKY]. But see Haye Kesteloo, DJI Releases Findings of Kivu Report to Stem
Concerns That China Might Use DJI’s Drones to Spy on the U.S., DRONEDJ (Apr. 23, 2018,
11:55 PM), https://dronedj.com/2018/04/23/dji-kivu-data-security-china-spying-us/ [https://
perma.cc/FK8N-S2SP] (discussing an independent report about one provider’s drone operating software that indicates that drone-captured images are not automatically shared with
the drone software provider); Alex Douglas, DJI Expands Data Privacy Protection for Government and Commercial Drone Operators, COM. DRONE PROF. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://
www.commercialdroneprofessional.com/dji-expands-data-privacy-protection-for-governme
nt-and-commercial-drone-operators/ [https://perma.cc/E79S-N7VV] (“Local Data Mode provides government and commercial customers with additional assurance that data generated
during drone operations is effectively protected. It is an internet connection ‘kill switch’ feature within DJI’s command and control mobile applications that, when enabled, prevents
the app from sending or receiving any data over the internet.”).
18. See Rick Aldrich, Privacy’s “Third-Party” Doctrine: Initial Developments in the Wake
of Carpenter, SCITECH LAW., Spring 2019, at 4, 5 (2019).
19. See Miller, supra note 1, at 361–62.
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has left drone-related privacy issues to states and localities.20 The
author has identified over 150 drone-specific provisions in dozens
of state and local codes that aim to protect the home from unwanted data collection by civilian drone operations.21 With the
unique privacy impacts presented by drones clearly defined, and
the interaction of drone data flows on the third-party doctrine thoroughly discussed, this Article assesses the potential efficacy of
these statutes and ordinances.22 In other words, do drone-specific
state and local laws even have the potential to address the unique
privacy problems presented by drones?23
The Article concludes by discussing the interplay between state
and local drone-specific privacy protections and the third-party
doctrine. Despite state and local legislative efforts, current privacy
jurisprudence and the third-party doctrine present nearly insurmountable barriers for someone seeking to assert a privacy interest in drone-captured data. Drones, even with their unique abilities, did not create these circumstances. Rather, drones and their
data flows simply highlight the logical ends of current privacy doctrines in the United States.
To support these claims, this Article operates from a specific definition of the terms “drone” and “drone usage” based on three key
assumptions. First, this Article assumes that a civilian operates
the drone for her own purposes—not on behalf of a government
unit or law enforcement agency. This assumption is based on a the-

20. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg.
42,064, 42,190 (June 28, 2016); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FAA, 821 F.3d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
21. This means statutes and ordinances that specifically include the terms “drone” or
“unmanned vehicle” or “unmanned aerial” in the provision. The full list of these laws is in
the Appendix.
22. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“In
circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive
way.” (citations omitted)).
23. See Rebecca L. Scharf, Drone Invasion: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Right to
Privacy, 94 IND. L.J. 1065, 1067 (2019) (suggesting that drone-specific privacy laws give
little consideration to the unique features of drones).
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ory common in privacy jurisprudence that “generally the police officer may do as the citizen would.”24 Related to this idea, the question of who is operating the drone is largely irrelevant to those who
might take steps to prevent privacy invasions by drones. Drones
are capable of flying in the same airspace regardless of whether a
government official or a civilian operates them. Looking at how
drones may be operated lawfully by private parties,25 therefore,
sets the standard against which people should expect drones to be
used even by the government,26 barring some other authorization27
that is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.28
The second assumption is that the civilian operator is flying the
drone lawfully. This means that the drone operator flies in compliance with all applicable FAA laws and regulations,29 as well as any
state and local laws.30 During such operations the potential impact
on privacy becomes relevant. Otherwise, the rules banning unlawful drone operations indirectly serve to protect privacy interests.31
The third assumption is that the drone only has image capture
capabilities of the visible light spectrum. The visible light spectrum
simply means what is visible to the naked eye.32 This excludes frequencies not visible to the naked eye, such as infrared and ultraviolet, as well as radio frequencies and other electromagnetic fields.33
Most drones come equipped with cameras capable of capturing the
visible light spectrum.34 Though drones can carry sensors capable

24. Marc Jonathan Blitz, James Grimsley, Stephen E. Henderson & Joseph Thai, Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 60
(2015).
25. Schlag, supra note 3, at 21–22.
26. Blitz et al., supra note 24, at 74–75; see, e.g., Jason Koebler, Internal Memo: National Guard Can Share Drone Surveillance with Law Enforcement, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 22,
2013), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/22/internal-memo-national-guard-ca
n-share-drone-surveillance-with-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/BP6D-QL2J].
27. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 21-213.
28. E.g., State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-0049, slip op. at 5–6 (D.N.D. July 31, 2012).
29. 14 C.F.R. §§ 107 et seq. (2020); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44809(a).
30. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-405 (barring aerial trespass by drone).
31. Villasenor, supra note 11, at 473.
32. Tour of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Visible Light, NASA SCI., https://science.nas
a.gov/ems/09_visiblelight [https://perma.cc/39MR-VULE].
33. See, e.g., AVENTURA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30.211(b) (2019).
34. See Brandon Gonzalez, Drones and Privacy in the Golden State, 33 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 288, 291 (2016).
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of acoustical listening or even chemical sensing (olfaction),35 the
privacy impact of these technologies is beyond the scope of this Article.
From these three assumptions about drone operations a sufficiently detailed assessment of the privacy impact of drone operations becomes possible. To make such an analysis meaningful, the
definition of “privacy” merits similar consideration. Privacy,
though, is notoriously difficult to define.36 In this Article, unless
stated otherwise, “privacy” simply means freedom from unwanted
visual observation in and about the home.
Linked to these assumptions about drones, visual observation in
the privacy context means observations of the visible light spectrum.37 Observations of the visible light spectrum have the most
developed privacy jurisprudence in the United States.38 This Article focuses on the home because, in the U.S. legal tradition, privacy
expectations and protections are at their highest and strongest in
and about the home.39 The freedom from visual observations of the
home ties closely to cases involving technology similar to drones,
such as manned, fixed-wing aircraft40 and helicopters.41 By establishing how drones might uniquely impinge one’s privacy interest
in freedom from visual observation in one’s most protected space,42
future discussions about other privacy interests43 and other technologies become possible by comparison and analogy.
To these ends, Part II defines lawful drone usage for the purposes of this Article while emphasizing the data-capture qualities
of drones. Part III distinguishes drones from other aircraft and
35. Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72, 86–
90 (2012).
36. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) (“Privacy . . . is a concept in
disarray.”).
37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
39. Id. at 37 (noting “the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home”).
40. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
41. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
42. WELLS C. BENNETT, BROOKINGS INST., CIVILIAN DRONES, PRIVACY, AND THE
FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE 3 (2014) (“As pressing as the question of how best to safeguard
‘public’ privacy, is the question of how best to safeguard its understudied counterpart, ‘private’ privacy.”).
43. E.g., Jeremy Friedman, Note, Prying Eyes in the Sky: Visual Aerial Surveillance of
Private Residences as a Tort, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 4 (2003) (discussing business
interests in freedom from visual observation).
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other image-capture techniques. This way, the unique operational
and image-capture qualities of drones, and how data flows through
them, can be clearly defined. Part IV presents the preexisting nondrone-specific legal privacy protections in and about the home. By
understanding these privacy protections through several different
analytical and legal frameworks, the protections extending to
drone data may be better understood.44 Taking all these factors
into account, Part V articulates the unique privacy impact of
drones. Part VI presents categories of drone-specific state and local
laws and assesses whether they are capable of protecting against
the unique impacts on privacy created by drone use and drone data
flows. This Part demonstrates that drones simply highlight the areas where the preexisting legal framework fails to offer adequate
privacy protections. The Article concludes with a discussion of
what elements of the legal framework might merit reform in light
of drones’ unique abilities, and suggestions for future analyses of
drones’ impact on privacy.
II. DEFINING DRONE USAGE
Drones are known by many names—unmanned aerial systems
(“UAS”),45 “‘remotely piloted vehicles (RPV),’ ‘unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),’ ‘models,’ and ‘radio control (R/C) aircraft.’”46 Though
the term “drone” originates from the military,47 this term is not in
official use.48 The FAA does not officially use the term “drone,”49 so
its use in this Article hopefully helps avoid confusion.
For the purposes of this Article, the term “drone” means an aerial vehicle with the following characteristics: (1) it meets the FAA’s

44. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Kaminski, supra note 3, at 66; Blitz
et al., supra note 24, at 80.
45. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 331(8), 126 Stat.
11, 72.
46. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) ROADMAP 7 (1st ed.
2013).
47. A Brief History of Drones, IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUMS, https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/a-brief-history-of-drones [https://perma.cc/BNB9-P7HL].
48. See Paul McBride, Comment, Beyond Orwell: The Application of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Domestic Surveillance Operations, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 627, 628–29 (2009).
49. FAA Modernization and Reform Act § 331(8).
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definition of an aircraft;50 (2) it is unmanned because it is “operated
without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or
on the aircraft”;51 (3) it weighs less than fifty-five pounds;52 (4) it
can be controlled for the purposes of flight operations and landing;53 (5) it is entirely remotely controlled;54 (6) it is mounted with
a camera- image capture device capable of recording the visible
light spectrum;55 and (7) the operator can see either in real time or
a recording of what the camera on the drone can capture in its field
of vision.56
The FAA requires registration of drones weighing over fifty-five
pounds in the same manner as a manned aircraft.57 Registration of
such a drone implicates other FAA regulations that require significant aeronautical knowledge and potentially even an FAAapproved type design of the aircraft.58 Acquiring such knowledge

50. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(6); see Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730,
at 4–8 (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/5730.pdf [https://perma.cc
/PX8H-SKXM].
51. FAA Modernization and Reform Act § 331(8).
52. Id. § 331(6).
53. Though the drone may be launched as a rocket, the ability to control it during flight
and to control the landing distinguishes drones from most model rockets and untethered
balloons. But see RC Lover san, Landing a Rocket Vertically, Without Being a Billionaire
Aka Rocket Drone, INSTRUCTABLES: OUTSIDE, https://www.instructables.com/id/Landing-aRocket-Vertically-Without-Being-a-Millio/ [https://perma.cc/WE3M-H7NJ].
54. The FAA includes “tethered UAS” in its definition of UAS, but for the purposes of
this Article, drones are distinguished from most kites and other flying contraptions tethered
to the ground. See FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 341(a), 132 Stat.
3186, 3284. But see Vidi Nene, Facebook Patents Dual Kite Aerial Vehicle, DRONE BELOW
(June 4, 2019), https://dronebelow.com/2019/06/04/facebook-patents-dual-kite-aerial-vehic
le/ [https://perma.cc/TQ8P-E2ZM].
55. See Scharf, supra note 23, at 1080. This Article will only focus on image capture
capabilities. In the field of audio capture, wiretap laws offer technology-neutral protections
against certain audio recordings of the home. As other scholars have noted, these laws can
likely be applied to the audio recording capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles. See Kaminski, supra note 3, at 65–66; Villasenor, supra note 11, at 498. Additionally, many state
and local laws explicitly include unconsented audio recordings in the list of improper drone
uses. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(f)(1) (West 2016). An interesting application of wiretap
statutes would arise in a scenario where a drone captures video footage of a person speaking
American Sign Language. See, e.g., Michael F. Kelleher, Comment, The Confidentiality of
Criminal Conversations on TDD Relay Systems, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1349 (1991).
56. Scharf, supra note 23, at 1102. Additionally, many drone-specific state and local
laws specifically mention drones’ recording capabilities. E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283.3
(2018); IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5(g) (2020).
57. See FAA DroneZone, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://faadronezone.faa.gov/#/ [https://
perma.cc/4UAJ-PRZ5] (“You must use the paper (N-number) registration process if [y]our
unmanned aircraft is 55 pounds or greater.”).
58. 14 C.F.R. § 47.33 (2020).
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and obtaining FAA-type design approval is the purview of manned
aircraft.59 Any discussion about drones’ impact on privacy that requires a drone that weighs more than fifty-five pounds60 is effectively a discussion about manned aircraft. Accordingly, concerns
about the capabilities of drones that weigh more than fifty-five
pounds should be addressed through privacy jurisprudence related
to manned aircraft. The privacy impact of drones should focus on
those devices that are not treated like manned aircraft.

59. It is worth noting that as of the time of this writing only one drone has received
FAA-type design approval. See Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria
for the Yamaha Fazer R, 84 Fed. Reg. 17,942 (Apr. 29, 2019) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
212). In late November 2020, the FAA issued notice of proposed airworthiness criteria in
the Federal Register for ten other drone types. See Certification for Advanced Operations
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Nov. 24, 2020, 2:24 PM), https://
www.faa.gov/uas/advanced_operations/certification/criteria_special_classes/ [https://perm
a.cc/MME4-GS2A].
60. Much scholarship has been dedicated to discussion of drone capabilities that either
explicitly or implicitly require a drone (based on currently available technology) to weigh
more than fifty-five pounds. Farber, supra note 2, at 6; San Pedro, supra note 4, at 713;
Farber, supra note 4, at 8; McBride, supra note 48, at 627–28; Barbee, supra note 2, at 468–
69; Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil Liability Concerns Arising from Domestic Law Enforcement Employment of Unmanned Aerial Systems, 85 N.D. L.
REV. 623, 644 (2009); Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of Something a Lot Like Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 209 (2012); David Gray & Danielle Citron,
The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 106 (2013); Robert Molko, The
Drones Are Coming! Will the Fourth Amendment Stop Their Threat to Our Privacy?, 78
BROOK. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (2013); Melanie Reid, Grounding Drones: Big Brother’s Tool Box
Needs Regulation Not Elimination, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 65 (2014); Chris Jenks, State
Labs of Federalism and Law Enforcement “Drone” Use, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1400
(2015); Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 354, 406–07 (2016); Mary Mara, A Look at the Fourth Amendment Implications of
Drone Surveillance by Law Enforcement Today, 9 CONLAWNOW 1, 4 (2017); Gerald S.
Reamy, Constitutional Shapeshifting: Giving the Fourth Amendment Substance in the Technology Driven World of Criminal Investigation, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 208–09 (2018);
J. Tyler Black, Note, Over Your Head, Under the Radar: An Examination of Changing Legislation, Aging Case Law, and Possible Solutions to the Domestic Police Drone Puzzle, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1829, 1831, 1840–41 (2013); Patrice Hendricksen, Note, Unmanned
and Unchecked: Confronting the Unmanned Aircraft System Privacy Threat Through Interagency Coordination, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 207, 215–16 (2013); Shane Crotty, Note, The
Aerial Dragnet: A Drone-ing Need for Fourth Amendment Change, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 219,
226–27 (2014); Andrew B. Talai, Comment, Drones and Jones: The Fourth Amendment and
Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 745–46 (2014); S. Alex Spelman,
Drones: Updating the Fourth Amendment and the Technological Trespass Doctrine, 16 NEV.
L.J. 373, 378–79, 400, 411 (2015); Nina Gavrilovic, Comment, The All-Seeing Eye in the Sky:
Drone Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 529, 550 (2016);
Steve Ragatzki, Comment, Filling in the Gaps in FAA Drone Regulations: A Proposed DualZone Model of Personal Privacy, 25 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 193, 199 (2017); Katherine Suominen, The Planet of the Drones: Comparing the Regulation of Commercial Drones in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 29 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 37, 39 (2016).
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The definition of “drone” used in this Article incorporates both
the small UAS (“sUAS”) and the model aircraft terms used by the
FAA.61 This Article simply uses the term “drone” to refer to a device
with all the above-mentioned features, regardless of whether the
FAA would consider it an sUAS or a model aircraft. Though the
distinctions between sUAS and model aircraft operations are important for drone operators to consider, lawful operations of both
are sufficiently similar that they can be discussed together for the
purposes of understanding the unique privacy impact of drones.
Federal Aviation Regulations under Part 107 and the FAA’s
model aircraft rules share several common provisions. Lawful operations for both classifications of aircraft require that the drone
operates (1) within the visual line of sight of the person operating
the aircraft or a visual observer co-located and in direct communication with the operator;62 (2) in Class G airspace;63 (3) below 400
feet; (4) in a manner that does not endanger people or property on
the ground; (5) by an operator who has passed an aeronautical
knowledge test; and (6) by an operator, if not the drone as well,
that is registered with the FAA.64 Upon application and approval,
the FAA can authorize drone operations that would otherwise violate these rules.65
Currently, the FAA only allows operations of drones over people
after both the drone and the operator meet extensive requirements.66 Importantly, under this set of conditions, a drone operator
can lawfully fly over her own property up to an altitude of 400
feet.67 Depending on the state or locality, the drone operator may
61. See 49 U.S.C. § 44809; 14 C.F.R. § 107.3 (2020).
62. 14 C.F.R. § 107.31 (2020). Drones operating strictly for hobby or recreational purposes must abide by the safety guidelines established by a “community-based organization.”
49 U.S.C. § 44809; 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.31, .33 (2020). The largest such organization is the
Academy of Model Aeronautics (the “AMA”). ACAD. OF MODEL AERONAUTICS, MEMBER
GUIDE 2 (2016). Like the corresponding FAA regulation, the AMA Safety Handbook requires
that drone operators “maintain [drone] . . . operations within visual line of sight.” ACAD. OF
MODEL AERONAUTICS, SAFETY HANDBOOK 4 (2018).
63. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA-G-8082-22 REMOTE PILOT—SMALL UNMANNED
SYSTEMS STUDY GUIDE 6 (2016).
64. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 107 et seq. (2020); 49 U.S.C. § 44809.
65. 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.200, .205 (2020).
66. Id. § 107.39; Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People, 88 Fed.
Reg. 4314, 4315 (Jan. 15, 2021).
67. See Villasenor, supra note 11, at 474–75; Blitz et al., supra note 24, at 71 n.107
(“What matters is not merely that a particular technical device or system is not overly unusual, but that its use in a particular context, in a particular way is not overly unusual.”

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/26/2021 3:42 PM

DRONES AND DATA

1003

even be able to operate the drone so that it may cross a neighbor’s
terrestrial property line lawfully.68
Drone sales exploded once lighter materials and better algorithms made both flight controls and image capture very easy for
even the least experienced drone operators.69 If a drone operates
without a camera capable of recording, then it is no different than
the model aircraft enjoyed by model aeronautics enthusiasts and
has no impact on the privacy interests discussed in this Article.
People primarily operate drones not for their flying abilities,70 but
rather for their data collection abilities.71 Some drones even allow
the operator to preprogram a flight path so the operator can focus
solely on image capture.72 Put concisely, drones are “simply the
platform for enabling surveillance.”73 In this Article, the data in
question is the images captured by the camera on the drone. Before

(emphasis omitted) (quoting HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 235 (2009))).
68. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103.
69. Tyler Hite, Note, Domestic Presence in the Skies: Why Americans Should Care About
Private Drone Regulation, 31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 184, 189–92 (2015); William C.
Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next Generation of
War Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1170 (2013).
70. The AMA is the largest model aircraft organization in the world. See supra note 62.
If drones were operated simply for the operator to enjoy their flight, then the recent explosion in drone sales would have been reflected by significant growth in AMA membership.
See Marcus Chavers, Consumer Drones by the Numbers in 2018 and Beyond, NEWS X LEDGE
(Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.newsledge.com/consumer-drones-2018-numbers/ [https://perm
a.cc/4AHB-PW6W]; Fact Sheet—The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aerospace
Forecast Fiscal Years (FY) 2020-2040, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.
faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=24756
[https://perma.cc/3JA2-T4K9].
That simply did not occur. Even with millions of drones sold, AMA membership has stayed
relatively constant. Compare Modelaircraft, AMA Air at 1:38, YOUTUBE (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PLYA5FHbSdqot9Txk-dKPc8NUJJJaW1nxb&v=Rn
GdGe5EdQQ [https://perma.cc/9GJR-HG63] (showing AMA membership numbers in 2016
exceeding 195,000 members), with Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 84
Fed. Reg. 72,438, 72,491 n.92 (Dec. 31, 2019) (noting the “Academy of Model Aeronautics
(AMA) has a membership of about 200,000”).
71. E.g., PRECISIONHAWK, ENRICHING DATA, EMPOWERING ACTION 8 (2020), https://
www.precisionhawk.com/hubfs/PrecisionHawk_Enriching%20Data,%20Empowering%20A
ction_Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/69V8-2YLM] (“What took ground teams 6 months to
inspect, took PrecisionHawk’s drone operators and data analysts just 6 weeks.”); see Vacek,
supra note 2, at 465; Farber, supra note 4, at 12.
72. Miller, supra note 1, at 353.
73. Hillary B. Farber, Keep Out! The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance and Privacy Torts
as Applied to Drones, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 370 (2017); accord Scharf, supra note 3, at
458.
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discussing drone image capture any further, it is necessary to distinguish drones from other aviation and image-capture technologies.
III. DISTINGUISHING DRONES FROM OTHER AIRCRAFT AND IMAGECAPTURE TECHNOLOGIES
This Part explains why drones are distinct from other flying machines and image-capture technologies. Through these distinctions, this Part will demonstrate that drones offer an image-capture perspective akin to the elevated vantage points on
neighboring properties. This Part concludes by distinguishing
drones from these fixed vantage points on neighboring properties.
A. Distinguishing Drones from Other Flying Machines
Drones are aircraft.74 The definition of drones used in this Article already distinguishes them from rockets, balloons, kites, and
other tethered flying machines.75 As aircraft, drones are distinct
from other manned flying machines liked fixed-wing aircraft (airplanes), rotary-wing aircraft (helicopters), and non-steer aircraft
(hot air balloons). Though drones that make visual observations of
the ground have elements in common with each of these flying machines, no other aircraft has the same combination of the following
characteristics: minimum safe altitude of lawful operations, maneuverability, required training, operator intent, and detectability.
Because of this combination of features drones can capture images
of the ground from vantage points and at a frequency inaccessible
to other flying machines.
1. Minimum Safe Altitude of Lawful Flight Operations
The more an aircraft weighs, the more gravity’s pull beckons. In
defining the minimum safe altitudes for operation, the FAA requires that all types of manned aircraft (fixed-wing, rotary-wing,
and hot air balloons) always operate at “[a]n altitude allowing, if a
power unit fails, an emergency landing without undue hazard to

74.
75.

See supra note 50.
See supra Part II.
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persons or property on the surface.”76 In practical terms, once an
emergency situation commences,77 the aircraft operator needs
enough time to try and steer the aircraft towards a location that
will minimize damage to the aircraft (and accordingly its pilots and
passengers), as well as people and objects on the ground.78
These altitude regulations reflect the FAA’s safety mandate.79
The FAA’s Center of Excellence study determined that if a drone
falling from the sky generates more than fifty-five foot-pounds of
energy, approximately seventy-five Joules, a lethal head injury can
occur about fifty percent of the time.80 To achieve this quantum of
energy, a drone weighing about five pounds would have to free fall
from 400 feet.81 The potential lethality of heavier drones falling
from lower altitudes can be extrapolated accordingly. Since the
FAA began keeping records of drone safety incidents, though, there
have been no drone-related fatalities.82
Because manned aircraft weigh hundreds, if not thousands, of
times more than drones,83 they cannot lawfully operate at such low
altitudes. Under normal operating conditions, any manned aircraft
flying over a populated area needs to keep a minimum altitude of
1000 feet.84 In contrast, drones are only allowed to operate up to

76. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(a) (2020).
77. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIRPLANE FLYING HANDBOOK (FAA-H-8083-3B) ch. 17,
at 17-6 (2017) (“The altitude available is, in many ways, the controlling factor in the successful accomplishment of an emergency landing.”).
78. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2020).
79. Safety: The Foundation of Everything We Do, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.faa.gov/about/safety_efficiency/ [https://perma.cc/3LYT-58WZ].
80. DAVID ARTERBURN, MARK EWING, RAJ PRABHU, FENG ZHU & DAVID FRANCIS, FINAL
REPORT FOR THE FAA UAS CENTER OF EXCELLENCE TASK A4: UAS GROUND COLLISION
SEVERITY EVALUATION 38 (2017); Foot-Pounds to Joules Conversion, METRIC CONVERSIONS,
https://www.metric-conversions.org/energy-and-power/foot-pounds-to-joules.htm [https://pe
rma.cc/AY4H-A85B].
81. ARTERBURN ET AL., supra note 80, at 47.
82. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-20-29, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS:
FAA’S COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT APPROACH FOR DRONES COULD BENEFIT FROM
IMPROVED COMMUNICATION AND DATA 11 (2019). Additionally, per a senior investigator at
the NTSB (the agency responsible for investigating aircraft accidents), only three collisions
between drones and manned aircraft have been “absolutely confirmed in the United States.”
Mike Collins, Bird Strike, or Drone Strike?, AOPA (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.aopa.org/ne
ws-and-media/all-news/2020/august/27/bird-strike-or-drone-strike?utm_source=epilot&ut
m_medium=email [https://perma.cc/A5R7-9CJL] (citing Bill English, an NTSB investigator
in charge).
83. ARTERBURN ET AL., supra note 80, at 47.
84. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b) (2020).
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400 feet.85 If a manned aircraft happens to be operating at 400 feet
lawfully, it would only be during take-off, landing, or in an emergency situation.86 Under any of these circumstances, the focus of
the aircraft operator should not be on taking pictures or video. But
a drone operator can operate at those altitudes and be focused on
taking pictures or video.
For these reasons, drones can be distinguished from all manned
aircraft because they can operate lawfully and safely for the purpose of image capture at much lower altitudes. Any discussion of
the privacy impact of drones that suggests that the drone can operate above 400 feet fails to distinguish drones from manned aircraft.87 If a drone happens to operate above 400 feet, it is in the
territory of manned aircraft and their associated privacy jurisprudence. The unique privacy impact of drones, therefore, can only be
understood if the drone operates below 400 feet.
2. Maneuverability
The most popular drones have a “quadcopter” design.88 Quadcopters, like manned helicopters, can both travel laterally and hover
85. Id. § 107.51(b).
86. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 77.
87. See Sam Jaffe Goldstein, ‘Nothing Kept Me up at Night the Way the Gorgon Stare
Did.’, LONGREADS (June 2019), https://longreads.com/2019/06/21/nothing-kept-me-up-atnight-the-way-the-gorgon-stare-did/ [https://perma.cc/M625-6MMS] (“The Gorgon Stare, a
military drone-surveillance technology that can track multiple moving targets at once, is
coming to a city near you.”); see also Vacek, supra note 2, at 480; Friedenzohn & Branum,
supra note 3, at 401; Mara, supra note 60, at 3; Talai, supra note 60, at 745–46, 761, 764;
Spelman, supra note 60, at 379, 411; Farber, supra note 2, at 6; Reid, supra note 60, at 8,
65; Black, supra note 60, at 1831, 1840, 1840 nn.38–39; Jenks, supra note 60, at 1400;
Crotty, supra note 60, at 227, 227 n.46; Gavrilovic, supra note 60, at 550; Suominen, supra
note 60, at 39; Gray & Citron, supra note 60, at 106; Barbee, supra note 2, at 468–69; Rapp,
supra note 60, at 644; Hendricksen, supra note 60, at 215; Jenkins, supra note 2, at 163,
171; Brandon Nagy, Note, Why They Can Watch You: Assessing the Constitutionality of Warrantless Unmanned Aerial Surveillance by Law Enforcement, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135,
138 (2014); Travis Dunlap, We’ve Got Our Eyes on You: When Surveillance by Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 173, 173, 180–
81, 201 (2009); Jordan M. Cash, Note, Droning on and on: A Tort Approach to Regulating
Hobbyist Drones, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 695, 697–98 (2016); Sean M. Nolan, Note, “Big Brother”
in the Private Sector: Privacy Threats Under the FAA’s New Civilian Drone Regulations, 82
BROOK. L. REV. 1451, 1464, 1462 (2017).
88. See Jim Fisher, The Best Drones for 2021, PCMAG (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.pc
mag.com/picks/the-best-drones?test_uuid=001OqhoHLBxsrrrMgWU3gQF&test_variant=b
[https://perma.cc/CP5R-G8ZG]; Justin Jaffe & Joshua Goldman, Best Drones for 2021,
CNET (Dec. 19, 2020, 12:11 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/best-drones-for-2021/ [https://
perma.cc/X3ZH-AVRP].
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in one spot in the air without moving laterally or vertically.89
Fixed-wing aircraft achieve lift by moving air over the airfoil of the
wing, necessitating lateral movement of the aircraft both for takeoff and at all times when traveling through the air.90 A fixed-wing
aircraft, therefore, cannot hover. For this reason, the maneuverability of drones is distinct from that of fixed-wing aircraft.91
The FAA deems hot air balloons “a nonsteerable aircraft.”92
Steering is a necessary component of maneuverability. Drones are
remotely controlled,93 implying steering control at all times, and
are therefore steerable aircraft. Accordingly, drones can be distinguished from fixed-wing aircraft and hot air balloons because they
are more steerable and maneuverable.
Two key factors distinguish the maneuverability of drones from
that of helicopters. Quadcopter drones are designed for a near vertical take-off,94 while this maneuver at a similar angle cannot be
achieved in civilian helicopter operations.95 Helicopters can operate at some of the same altitudes as drones but only with FAA permission on a strictly preset flight path.96 Simply due to their massive size differences, though, helicopters would not be able to fly as
safely near obstacles on the ground as drones.
Specifically, all aircraft must fly at a minimum altitude that allows for as safe a landing as possible in the event of engine failure.97 To meet this safety standard, helicopters must attempt to fly
89. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK (FAA-H-8083-21B), at 9-6
(2019) [hereinafter FAA HELICOPTER HANDBOOK].
90. Univ. of Iowa, The Secret of Flight 4: Discovery of Dynamic Lift at 20:33–23:29,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8WKNrfFdaYM&list=PL7d8
BmotflM0QXn2EPyvEJ4GxYFl32qCA&index=4 [https://perma.cc/ER24-9LKF].
91. See Olivito, supra note 3, at 676–77.
92. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., BALLOON FLYING HANDBOOK (FAA-H-8083-11A), at 7-7
(2008). Unmanned hot air balloons are sometimes known as “sky lanterns.” WASH. REV.
CODE § 76.04.005(19). Sky lanterns are banned in the majority of states due to the fire hazards they pose. Update on the Legality of Sky Lanterns—Banned in 29 States, WILDFIRE
TODAY (Dec. 31, 2015), https://wildfiretoday.com/2015/12/31/update-on-the-legality-of-skylanterns-banned-in-28-states/ [https://perma.cc/76CA-9HL3]. Like hot air balloons, sky lanterns are not capable of steering.
93. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
94. E.g., Drones Plus, DJI Drone Automatic Takeoff & Landing Demonstration,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tHf2Z4G1w3s [https://perma.
cc/S3MB-HUV2].
95. FAA HELICOPTER HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 10-3.
96. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(d) (2020).
97. Id. § 91.119(a).
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into the wind when operating at low altitudes.98 The winds in and
around obstacles on the ground, like buildings and trees, are irregular,99 making lawful helicopter operations (with the exception of
take-off and landing) at such low altitudes nearly impossible. Because helicopters have a more limited set of operating conditions
in which they safely and lawfully gather information, drones can
be distinguished from helicopters based on maneuverability. This
allows drones to capture images of the ground otherwise inaccessible to helicopters.
3. Required Training
All manned aircraft pilots require extensive training before they
can operate such aircraft alone. In addition to qualifying medically
and completing classroom training, manned aircraft pilots must
pass written exams, accumulate training flights hours in the air,
and pass a check ride with an FAA official.100 All of these steps aim
to impress the importance of safety and proficiency in all new pilots. Costs aside,101 the time invested in becoming a licensed pilot
represents a barrier to entry that fewer overcome each year.102
No training is required to operate a drone. Though drone operators must pass an aeronautical knowledge test,103 these assessments do not test the drone operator’s actual ability to control the
drone safely during flight.104 One could pass the test even before
having access to a drone. Drone manufacturers specifically make

98. FAA HELICOPTER HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 10-2.
99. Id. at 10-10.
100. Become a Pilot, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.faa.gov/pilots/become/ [https://perma.cc/5MJH-73SP].
101. It can cost up to $10,000 to earn a private pilot’s license. Greg Brown, Become a
Pilot for How Much?, AOPA (Oct. 22, 2013), https://www.aopa.org/training-and-safety/flight
-schools/flight-school-business/newsletter/2013/october/22/become-a-pilot-for-how-much
[https://perma.cc/S8KN-W4ZP].
102. U.S. Civil Airmen Statistics, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.fa
a.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/civil_airmen_statistics/ [https://perma.cc/GQ4
D-ZSBZ] (showing steadily declining pilot numbers from 2005–2018).
103. 14 C.F.R. § 107.12(a)(1) (2020); FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115254, § 341(a)(7), 132 Stat. 3186, 3284–85.
104. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., REMOTE PILOT—SMALL UNMANNED SYSTEMS STUDY
GUIDE (FAA-G-8082-22), at iii–v (2016) (listing the topics on remote pilot exam, not including questions about how to operate a drone).
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them very easy to fly with no training105 by allowing for flight controls through a mobile phone app.106 Taken to its comedic, albeit
fictional, extreme, even one-handed Buster Bluth can operate a
drone as if it were an arcade game.107 The number of remote pilot
certificate holders has increased by roughly 40,000 each year since
the certification was offered.108 Training, accordingly, is not a barrier to access for civilian drone operations.
It is important to remember that drones discussed in this Article
must be flown within the visual line of sight of the operator.109
Much like the differences between visual flight rules and instrument flight rules for manned aircraft,110 drone operators must rely
on sophisticated instruments to fly drones beyond the visual line
of sight (“BVLOS”) of the drone operator.111 With few exceptions,112
U.S. drone BVLOS operations have been reserved almost exclusively for military and search-and-rescue operators.113 Safely flying
drones in BVLOS conditions requires an extensive flight program.114 Accordingly, discussions of the privacy impact of drones
105. Scharf, supra note 23, at 1073.
106. See Fisher, supra note 88.
107. Marra & McNeil, supra note 69, at 1170; Arrested Development: Off the Hook (Netflix May 26, 2013).
108. U.S. Civil Airmen Statistics, supra note 102 (presenting remote pilot numbers from
2016–2018).
109. See supra note 62.
110. Steven Mark Sachs, What Is the Difference Between VFR and IFR Flying?, CAL.
AERONAUTICAL U. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://calaero.edu/difference-between-vfr-ifr/ [https://
perma.cc/6S44-ZPV7].
111. Mariella Moon, First FAA-Approved Beyond-Line-of-Sight Drone Flies in the U.S.,
ENGADGET (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019/08/03/faa-approved-beyond-visu
al-line-of-sight-drone/ [https://perma.cc/LRD9-JNVY] (discussing use of automatic sense
and avoid technology to operate the drone beyond visual line of sight safely).
112. See Jonathan Drew, North Carolina Hospital Using Drones to Fly Blood Samples
Between Buildings, WLOS NEWS 13 (Mar. 27, 2019), https://wlos.com/news/local/north-caro
lina-hospital-using-drones-to-fly-blood-samples-between-buildings [https://perma.cc/4WTJ
-YMA6]; Evan Ackerman, Zipline Launches Long-Distance Drone Delivery of COVID-19
Supplies in the U.S., IEEE SPECTRUM (May 27, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/au
tomaton/robotics/drones/zipline-long-distance-delivery-covid19-supplies [https://perma.cc/5
LC3-62JL].
113. Adrian Sainz, Eyes in the Sky: Heat-Seeking Drones Used After Tornado, AP NEWS
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://apnews.com/7dee63a29bad4fdb87c4b2dc98300dbb/ [https://perma.cc
/678H-5HPG].
114. Kansas State University Polytechnic Campus’s Applied Aviation Research Center
has received at least two BVLOS waivers from the FAA in part because, as articulated by
Kurt Carraway, the head of the Research Center, “our ability to conduct thorough operational risk assessments and articulate those into safety cases . . . to garner FAA approval
for advanced UAS operations.” K-State Polytechnic Campus Receives Waiver to Fly UAS
BVLOS in All Class G Airspace Nationwide, AUVSI NEWS (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.auv
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that suggest BVLOS operations assume a type of drone operation
that simply does not take place with any regularity.115 Drones that
operate BVLOS, therefore, require investment in operational resources akin to manned aircraft.116
For these reasons, drones are completely distinct from manned
aircraft in terms of their training requirements. This means that
more people have the possibility to operate drones for the purpose
of image capture than pilots flying manned aircraft for the same
reason.

si.org/industry-news/k-state-polytechnic-campus-receives-waiver-fly-uas-bvlos-all-class-g-a
irspace [https://perma.cc/9CDK-A2PT].
115. See Farber, supra note 4, at 7; Goldstein, supra note 87; Schlag, supra note 3, at 12;
Joseph J. Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching—Or Will He? Constitutional, Regulatory, and Operational Issues Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Law Enforcement, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673, 674 (2009) (suggesting persistent drone operations that require BVLOS operations); Mara, supra note 60, at 3–5; Alexandria Tomanelli, A Drone’s Eye
View: Why and How the Federal Aviation Administration Should Regulate Hobbyist Drone
Use, 34 TOURO L. REV. 867, 877, 879 (2018); Nolan, supra note 87, at 1459; Talai, supra note
60, at 745–46; McNeal, supra note 60, at 406–07; Spelman, supra note 60, at 379, 400, 411;
Farber, supra note 2, at 6; Ragatzki, supra note 60, at 199; Reid, supra note 60, at 8, 65;
Derek Larson & Patrick S. Roberts, How Two Traditions of Privacy Defenses in Image Capture Technology Inform the Debate Over Drones, 13 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 465,
487 (2017); Mark G. Huffman, Note, “Honey, There’s a Drone on the Lawn”: Assessing the
Supreme Court’s Unspoken Perspective on the Future of Drones in the Commercial Industry,
18 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 145 (2017); Black, supra note 60, at 1831,
1840; Gray & Citron, supra note 60, at 106; Suominen, supra note 60, at 39; Molko, supra
note 60, at 1286; Gavrilovic, supra note 60, at 550; Jenks, supra note 60, at 1400; Crotty,
supra note 60, at 227; Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326,
370 (2015); Barbee, supra note 2, at 468–69; Rapp, supra note 60, at 644.
116. Simply looking at documentation requirements, BVLOS operations and manned
flight operations are remarkably similar. Compare IRIS AUTOMATION, NAVIGATING THE
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE TOWARDS BVLOS OPERATIONS, AUVSI WEBINAR 9–15 (May 2020)
(listing the documentation likely needed to run BVLOS operations, including: “1. General
Operating Manual/Flight Operations Manual, 2. Standard Operating Procedures, 3. Emergency Management, 4. Safety Management System, 5. Training & Maintenance”) (on file
with author), with Manual Contents, 14 C.F.R. § 135.23(a) (2020) (for manned aircraft compensation or hire operations, “The manual must include—. . . . (d) Procedures for complying
with accident notification requirements; . . . (k) Procedures to be followed by the pilot in
command in the briefing under § 135.117; . . . . (l) Flight locating procedures, when applicable; (m) Procedures for ensuring compliance with emergency procedures, . . . ; (n) En route
qualification procedures for pilots, when applicable; (o) The approved aircraft inspection
program, when applicable”).
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4. Operator Intent
Most civilian drones have an electric motor117 that uses batteries
as a power supply.118 At full charge, they only stay in the air for a
few minutes.119 A drone operator will spend at most a few cents to
fully charge a drone battery.120 These low operating costs mean
that drone operators can fly them intermittently with little preparation.
Nearly all manned aircraft use fuel combustion to generate
power.121 Airplanes and helicopters consume crude oil derivatives
known as Jet Fuel and Avgas.122 Like gasoline, their prices change
regularly. As of the writing of this Article, fuel prices at southeastern Virginia airports ranged from $3.39 to $7.08 per gallon.123 Using a Cessna 172, the most popular small, manned aircraft in the
United States,124 can help illustrate the massive difference in operating costs between manned aircraft and drones.
A 1997–2007 Cessna 172R has a fuel capacity of fifty-six gallons
and a fuel burn rate of about 8.6 gallons per hour.125 Assuming a

117. See Olivito, supra note 3, at 676.
118. See Joe Pappalardo, New Lithium Metal Batteries Can Power Drones for Longer
(and It Could Change Everything), POPULAR MECHS. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/drones/a27155551/battery-boeing/ [https://perma.cc/TF36-L4H8].
119. See id.
120. See BU-1006: Cost of Mobile and Renewable Power, BATTERY U. (May 19, 2017),
https://batteryuniversity.com/index.php/learn/article/bu_1006_cost_of_mobile_power [http
s://perma.cc/Z4AZ-U48F]; Average Energy Prices for the United States, Regions, Census Divisions, and Selected Metropolitan Areas, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/reg
ions/midwest/data/averageenergyprices_selectedareas_table.htm [https://perma.cc/P7F4-8
2JM].
121. But see Maya Wei-Haas, Inside the First Solar-Powered Flight Around the World,
SMITHSONIAN (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/inside-first-sol
ar-powered-flight-around-world-180968000/ [https://perma.cc/Z7BC-TRSY].
122. See Focus on Fuel Part One: Different Types of Aviation Fuel, JETEX, https://www.
jetex.com/focus-fuel-part-one-different-types-aviation-fuel/ [https://perma.cc/TBC7-RVRR].
123. Fuel Prices, AIRNAV (Jan. 4, 2021), http://www.airnav.com/fuel/local.html [https://
perma.cc/J9AC-AE4X] (search for “KPHF—Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport, Newport News, Va.”) (results on file with author).
124. Isabel Goyer, Cessna 172: Still Relevant Today, FLYING MAG. (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://www.flyingmag.com/story/aircraft/cessna-172-still-relevant/ [https://perma.cc/SH8
F-LVVX]. Though some popular models of manned aircraft have been modified to run on
electric propulsion systems, such aircraft are not widely in use. See Jim Moore, Watch First
Electric Caravan Fly, AOPA (May 20, 2020), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/allnews/2020/may/20/watch-first-electric-caravan-fly [https://perma.cc/PYF6-P2FC].
125. Cessna 172: Specifications, AOPA, https://www.aopa.org/go-fly/aircraft-and-owners
hip/aircraft-fact-sheets/cessna-172 [https://perma.cc/B3FS-EC96].
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price of $5.00 per gallon for fuel, this means a Cessna pilot would
spend about $280 for six hours of flight time.126 Fuel costs, though,
represent only a tiny fraction of the financial considerations involved in owning and operating a manned aircraft.127 A manned
aircraft can stay in the air much longer than a drone, but the cost
of getting it there is immensely greater. This suggests that pilots
operate manned aircraft with much more specific intentions than
drone operators.
Drones operate primarily to make visual observations of the
ground through their cameras.128 Aircraft primarily operate to
transport people and cargo,129 but can also be used to make visual
observations. Even when a pilot flies a manned aircraft specifically
to make visual observations of the ground,130 she demonstrates
much more intentionality than a drone operator.
The camera found on a drone is typically attached to a gimbal.131
The gimbal prevents the camera from vibrating during flight, allows the camera to move independently of the drone, and adjusts
the camera automatically through the drone operations software
program.132 This means that a drone will nearly automatically capture focused images of objects on the ground. Simply by operating
the drone, even without specifically intending to do so, the drone
operator enjoys detailed visual observations of the ground.

126. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INFO 08004, COMPARISON OF MINIMUM FUEL,
EMERGENCY FUEL AND RESERVE FUEL 2 (2008) (explaining minimum fuel requirements for
lawful operations).
127. See Hypothetical Operating Cost Calculation, AOPA, https://www.aopa.org/gofly/aircraft-and-ownership/buying-an-aircraft/tips-on-buying-used-aircraft/hypothetical-op
erating-cost-calculation [https://perma.cc/SM2T-MTL2]. Acquirers of civilian drones will
spend a fraction of what the purchase price of even a used manned aircraft would cost. See
Scharf, supra note 3, at 466. Because this discussion focuses on drone operations, purchase
costs are not pertinent.
128. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
129. See Blitz et al., supra note 24, at 54, 66.
130. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
131. See Fisher, supra note 88.
132. Fintan Corrigan, Drone Gimbal Design, Parts and Top Gimbals for Aerial Filming,
DRONEZON (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.dronezon.com/learn-about-drones-quadcopters/dro
ne-gimbal-design-components-parts-technology-overview/ [https://perma.cc/9D2B-STC7].
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To achieve the same quality of images133 from a manned aircraft,
the operator would need costly, specialized, photographic equipment.134 Aircraft used primarily for aerial photography have a restricted airworthiness certificate that limits their operations.135
Accordingly, the specific intention to capture images of the ground
is set at the moment of aircraft purchase. To install such equipment on a civilian manned aircraft after purchase requires a similar level of intent because such installation requires special permissions from the FAA through its supplemental type certificate
process.136 To get as close as possible to a drone-quality photograph
with a manned aircraft, a gimbal would have to be attached to a
helicopter. Helicopter operating costs exceed those of a fixed-wing
aircraft.137
The intent required for a manned aircraft to capture images of
the ground also affects the lifecycle of those images. Companies
like EagleView (formerly Pictometry) use manned aircraft to capture images of the ground and license those images for a fee.138
Bing Maps, for example, used photos from Pictometry to populate
some images of its Bird’s Eye View.139 These images are only
shared pursuant to contractual terms that protect EagleView’s intellectual property rights and economic interests. This means that
those who share images captured from manned aircraft do so very
intentionally.
The lifecycle of civilian drone-captured images is very different.
As described eloquently by Joseph Vacek, the drone “data chain
contains four links: (1) drone operation itself, (2) in-flight data col-

133. See infra section III.B.
134. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
135. 14 C.F.R. § 21.25 (2020).
136. Id. §§ 21.111–.119.
137. Compare Hypothetical Operating Cost Calculation, supra note 127 (showing fixedwing aircraft operating costs), with ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY, R44 RAVEN II & R44
CLIPPER II ESTIMATED OPERATING COSTS (Jan. 15, 2020), https://robinsonheli.com/wp-cont
ent/uploads/2020/01/r44_2_eoc.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY4C-9JG6] (showing helicopter operating costs).
138. EagleView Reveal, EAGLEVIEW, https://www.eagleview.com/products/eagleview-rev
iew [https://perma.cc/APC2-SPDT].
139. Art Kalinski, Oblique Imagery: The New Kids on the Block, GEOSPATIAL SOLUTIONS
(July 2, 2013), http://geospatial-solutions.com/oblique-imagery-the-new-kids-on-the-block/
[https://perma.cc/U8YP-8XMP].
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lection, (3) post-flight data processing, and (4) data use, dissemination, and storage.”140 Visual observations made by drones are
covered in links two through four of the data chain. Once the data
leaves the drone and its operating software begins processing it, it
is likely the captured images themselves have effectively been
shared with the drone software provider141 making them a business record of the drone software provider.142 This means that
simply by flying the drone, the drone operator has shared the images. The level of intent needed to share drone-captured images,
therefore, is much lower than that of manned aircraft.
With all these factors combined, capturing visual observations
from a manned aircraft requires a very high level of intentionality—to capture images, by having specialized equipment installed
on an aircraft, that is expensive to operate. For a drone, the level
of intention required for detailed observations of the ground is
achieved merely by deciding to operate the drone. Additionally, images captured from manned aircraft are shared very intentionally.
That same level of intent is utterly absent in the process of sharing
drone-captured images. The degree of difference is so great that it
is effectively a different kind of intent.143 Accordingly, drone image
capture can be differentiated from manned aircraft based on the
differences in operator intent.
5. Detectability
A person not operating a drone would hopefully be able to detect
the presence of a drone through either visual or auditory cues.144

140. Vacek, supra note 7, at 139.
141. See supra note 17.
142. See Aldrich, supra note 18, at 5.
143. See Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 330–40 (2014)
(building on Justice Alito’s concurrence in U.S. v. Jones, arguing that massive differences
in cost scales differentiate surveillance technologies to such a degree that the resulting
searches should be treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes).
144. Most people also enjoy use of their senses of smell, touch, and taste. By the time
someone could use any of those senses to detect a drone, hopefully she would have heard it
or seen it first. But see WW2 People’s War: North London During the Blitz, BBC (Nov. 4,
2003), https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/01/a1965701.shtml [https://pe
rma.cc/6BXZ-7ZE9] (“The incendiary bombs were far more insidious. You couldn’t hear
these coming . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Most drones produce sounds as loud as eighty decibels.145 Decibels
are measured on a logarithmic scale—every ten decibels reflect a
doubling of “loudness.”146 For comparison, from a distance of 100
feet a helicopter produces about 100 decibels,147 making it at least
four times as loud as a drone. To a person located outdoors, these
drones sound about as loud a small aircraft flying at 1000 feet or a
passenger car fifty feet away traveling at sixty-five miles per
hour.148 But even the nosiest drones would not sound this loud because operations over people are limited by regulations, so the
drone would have to operate at some safe distance.149 Drones would
sound even quieter to someone inside a home.
The quietest drones produce only about sixty decibels of
sound.150 Background music or a normal conversation from a distance of three feet sounds this loud.151 This is between one-half and
one-quarter as loud as a normal drone. If someone were in a home
and a quiet drone flew by, only the relative novelty of the sound
might alert her to the drone’s presence.152 Though drones are not
auditorily undetectable, they make relatively little noise, especially when compared to manned aircraft.
Assuming someone who is not operating a drone hears it, then
she would have to make visual contact with it to determine what
images it might be capturing.153 From a visual perspective, drones
145. Kennedy Martinez, What Are the Best Silent Drone Choices and What Applications
Are They Good For?, DRONEENTHUSIAST (Jan. 8, 2021) [hereinafter Silent Drones],
https://www.dronethusiast.com/what-are-the-best-silent-drone-choices-and-what-applicati
ons-are-they-good-for/ [https://perma.cc/6Y2C-DHNU].
146. CITY OF TORRANCE, DECIBEL INFORMATION FACT SHEET 1 (2011), https://www.torr
anceca.gov/home/showdocument?id=5712 [https://perma.cc/ZS3M-QP4T].
147. Noise Sources and Their Effects, DEP’T CHEMISTRY PURDUE U., https://www.chem.p
urdue.edu/chemsafety/Training/PPETrain/dblevels.htm [https://perma.cc/7WU5-PHDG].
148. SPOKANE INT’L AIRPORT, MASTER PLAN ch. 6, at 6-3 (2014) [hereinafter SPOKANE
MASTER PLAN], https://business.spokaneairports.net/core/files/business/uploads/files/Maste
r%20Plan/9_%20Chapter%206.pdf [https://perma.cc/85A6-E9GY].
149. 14 C.F.R. § 107.39 (2020); see Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over
People, 88 Fed. Reg. 4314 (Jan. 15, 2021).
150. Silent Drones, supra note 145.
151. SPOKANE MASTER PLAN, supra note 148, at 6-3.
152. ANDREW CHRISTIAN & RANDOLPH CABELL, NASA LANGLEY RESEARCH CTR., INITIAL
INVESTIGATION INTO THE PSYCHOACOUSTIC PROPERTIES OF SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEM NOISE 16–19 (2017) (suggesting that drones, though as loud as neighborhood traffic
sounds, are perceived to be more annoying because of the relative novelty of the sound they
make).
153. Most drones have a “quadcopter” design. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, spotting a quadcopter in the air effectively means identifying a drone. But some
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are a mere fraction of the size of manned aircraft.154 It is harder to
see a smaller thing than a larger thing. Fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters only regularly operate at low altitudes during take-off
and landing, but people within those flight paths would have notice
of the aircrafts’ presence.155
Drones are not allowed to operate in the same airspaces as
manned aircraft,156 so the chance of seeing an airplane or helicopter operating at the same altitude as a drone would be very slim.
Even though hot air balloons, for short periods of time, can lawfully
travel at low speeds and low altitudes similar to drones in flight,157
their massive size158 would likely alert someone to the hot air balloon’s presence. These factors combine to make drones operating
for the purpose of image capture far less visually detectable than
manned aircraft.
Aside from the fact that drones are smaller and quieter than
manned aircraft, all manned aircraft must display their FAA registration numbers conspicuously.159 If a manned aircraft were being operated for the specific purpose of making visual observations
of the ground, it would hover or fly in a regular pattern at a low
altitude.160 Because of the display requirements for its registration
number, someone on the ground could learn about who is operating

unmanned aerial vehicles that meet this Article’s definition of “drone” are designed to look
and move like birds, and therefore may be even harder to detect as drones. Zach Ryall,
A Bird James Bond Might Love, AOPA (July 20, 2020), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-med
ia/all-news/2020/july/20/a-bird-james-bond-might-love?utm_source=dronepilot&utm_medi
um=email [https://perma.cc/2J5Z-9RAY] (“These surveillance robots are very stealthy, hiding in plain sight and making barely a sound.”).
154. See Y. Douglas Yang, Note, Big Brother’s Grown Wings: The Domestic Proliferation
of Drone Surveillance and the Law’s Response, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 343, 372 n.214 (2014).
155. See, e.g., EL DORADO CTY., AIRPORT LAND USE COMPATIBILITY PLAN, at x, 4–19, 4–
24 (2012).
156. 14 C.F.R. § 107.43 (2020).
157. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., BALLOON FLYING HANDBOOK (FAA-H-8083-11A), at 7–8, 9
(2008).
158. Hot Air Balloon Ride FAQs, SKY DRIFTERS, https://skydrifters.com/faq/ [https://per
ma.cc/LD8Q-94JH] (“The most popular size [of hot air balloon] is about 55 feet wide and 7
stories tall.”).
159. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO. 45-2D, at 3 (2009) (requiring display of the registration number “outside the aircraft so that it is legible from the ground”).
160. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV., FOREST HEALTH TECH. ENTER. TEAM,
FHTET 00-01, A GUIDE TO CONDUCTING AERIAL SKETCHMAPPING SURVEYS 28–44 (2000),
https://www.fs.fed.us/foresthealth/technology/pdfs/Sketchmapping.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9
7G-YK6N].
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the manned aircraft. This makes spotting a manned aircraft conducting visual observations tantamount to learning who is doing
the observing.161 Merely detecting a drone’s presence, though, does
not alert the observed to who is doing the observing.
Even if the drone is flying over a neighbor’s property and making
observations in the area, it is only a presumption that the neighbor
is in fact operating the drone.162 There are only a handful of ways
that someone can learn who is operating a drone. First, the drone
operator could let people nearby know about the drone’s operation
and associated image capture.163 Second, someone could make a direct observation of the person operating the drone.164 To do so lawfully, the observer would have to locate the drone operator without
trespassing or violating any other laws.165 Third, after discovering
a drone’s identifying numbers, an inquiry could be made to the
FAA as to who is the drone’s registered owner, and accordingly,
narrow the search for the possible drone operator.
All drones must have an FAA registration number on them.166
Only a handful of FAA staffers have access to the database which
links drone registration numbers to the names of registrants.167
Staffers only query the database upon request from government
investigators or law enforcement officers.168 Accordingly, upon

161. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 241–42 (1986) (describing Dow’s
process of tracing aerial photographs based on FAA registration numbers).
162. E.g., Myles Ma, Lower Township Man Admits to Firing Shotgun at Drone, NJ.COM
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nj.com/news/2016/02/lower_township_man_admits_to_firing_s
hotgun_at_dro.html [https://perma.cc/ZTG6-NKRX] (assuming his neighbor was operating
the drone when in fact it was another person).
163. This would be consistent with the NTIA’s voluntary best practices regarding drone
privacy. NAT’L TELECOM. & INFO. ADMIN., VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR UAS PRIVACY,
TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2016). Because these recommendations are voluntary, there is no means at the federal level for directly enforcing this practice upon drone
operators.
164. Assuming, per note 62 and accompanying text, the drone operator is maintaining
the drone within visual line of sight. But see, e.g., Sam Lewis, FAA Grants Skyward Staff
Permission to Conduct BVLOS Infrastructure Inspections from Their Homes, COM. DRONE
PROF. (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.commercialdroneprofessional.com/faa-grants-skywardstaff-permission-to-conduct-bvlos-infrastructure-inspections-from-their-homes/ [https://per
ma.cc/4HX5-52N60].
165. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DRONE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE 1 (2018) (instructing local law enforcement officers to “attempt to locate” the drone operator by looking
at windows, balconies, and rooftops).
166. 14 C.F.R. § 107.13 (2020).
167. E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 82, at 11.
168. Id. at 17–18.
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learning a drone’s registration number, an occupant would have to
engage a law enforcement officer or FAA investigator to make an
inquiry to the FAA to identify the registrant.
There are several ways to learn a drone’s registration number.
The occupant could read the registration number after bringing it
to the ground by disabling it, thereby committing a variety of possible crimes, including violating the Aircraft Sabotage Act.169 Similarly, the drone could fall to the ground (not land) on another’s
property, thereby operating unsafely contrary to FAA regulations.170
The new Remote ID regulation provides another avenue to possibly learn the operator of drone. Under Remote ID, a person on
the ground would be able to access a broadcast of some information
from the drones operating in the area—including either the drone’s
serial number or session ID for a particular flight by a drone and
“an indication of the control station’s latitude[,] . . . longitude [and]
barometric pressure altitude.”171 The occupant would have to record the information during the course of the broadcast and travel
to the control station. But without a grounded drone, it may be
more difficult to persuade local law enforcement to query to FAA
to identify the drone’s registered owner. In an effort to identify a
drone operator, therefore, the most Remote ID can do is potentially
narrow the search.172
169. E.g., Timothy B. Lee, Man Shoots Down Drone, Gets Hit with Felony Charges in
Minnesota, ARSTECHNICA (May 16, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-poli
cy/2020/05/minnesota-man-faces-felony-charges-for-shooting-down-drone/ [https://perma.c
c/YF3X-UBQ5]. Note that the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 authorizes federal
agencies, under certain circumstances, to disable drones without committing a crime under
the Aircraft Sabotage Act. 6 U.S.C. § 124n. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES TO PROTECT CERTAIN
FACILITIES OR ASSETS FROM UNMANNED AIRCRAFT AND UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (Apr.
13, 2020). But even with such authority, the agencies of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security appear to be lacking the “capability to counter illicit UAS activity.” Memorandum
from Joseph V. Cuffari, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament, Senior Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 25, 2020) (on file with author).
170. 14 C.F.R. § 107.23 (2020).
171. Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft, 86 Fed. Reg. 4390, 4417 (Jan. 15,
2021) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 89.305).
172. These data elements about a drone in flight fall short of the suggested industry
standards for remote drone identification set forth by American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) Unmanned Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative. AM. NAT’L
STANDARDS INST., UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS STANDARDIZATION COLLABORATIVE,
UASSC 20-001 WORKING DRAFT 250–51 (2020), https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Docum
ents/Standards%20Activities/UASSC/UASSC_20-001_WORKING_DRAFT_ANSI_UASSC
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Even after identifying the drone’s registered owner, independent
evidence would still be needed to indicate who was operating the
drone. The FAA itself has declined to prosecute registrants of
drones operating illegally because drone registration does not
prove who was actually flying the drone at any specific time.173 All
told, barring an operator’s voluntary disclosure or direct observation of the drone operator, it is very difficult for an occupant to
learn who is making observations of her property.
For these reasons, drones are far less detectable than manned
aircraft174 and, when all parties behave lawfully, effectively undetectable for the purpose of determining who is using them to make
visual observations.
B. Distinguishing Drones from Other Aerial Imaging
Technologies
Aerial imaging is part of the field of remote sensing. Because
this Article focuses on visual observations,175 the sensor in question
is a camera capable of capturing the visible light spectrum.
Manned aerial photography and satellite imaging are the most
common remote sensing technologies.176 Civilians’ most common
means of access to these images—Google Earth and Bing Maps—
provide a framework for distinguishing drone-captured images
from other remote sensing technologies.177 Remote sensing practitioners differentiate images captured from various technologies using several key criteria: swath, nadir point, and resolution. Using
these criteria, it is possible to distinguish images captured by

_Roadmap_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/558Z-LADD]. If Remote ID had required the additional
data elements, as suggested by ANSI, then it would be easier to identify who was actually
operating the drone.
173. E.g., Vianney Cardenas, Bighorn Fire Drone Pilot Is Free of Charges, KVOA TUCSON
(Aug. 26, 2020, 7:57 PM), https://kvoa.com/uncategorized/2020/08/26/bighorn-fire-drone-pil
ot-is-free-of-charges/ [https://perma.cc/US97-9RP3] (“The Federal Aviation Administration
decided against prosecuting the suspect because they could not prove who the pilot flying
the drone was.”).
174. Scharf, supra note 23, at 1080; Hendricksen, supra note 60, at 215; Jenkins, supra
note 2, at 163, 171; Dunlap, supra note 87, at 173, 180–81, 201; Nagy, supra note 87, at 138.
175. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
176. See Brian Craig, Online Satellite and Aerial Images: Issues and Analysis, 83 N.D.
L. REV. 547, 548 (2007).
177. See Blitz et al., supra note 24, at 75.
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drones from those captured by other technologies.178 These differences reveal that the image capture qualities of drones are most
similar to what a neighbor might see from elevated vantage points
on her property. Several features differentiate drones from image
capture vantage points on a neighbor’s property. Before delving
into all these distinctions, below is a quick overview of the relevant
remote sensing terms.
1. Key Terms in Remote Sensing
The device that captures the desired images is called the sensor.
The sensors discussed here are simply visible light cameras attached to a platform: drone, manned aircraft, or satellite. The field
of view is “the angular cone of visibility of the sensor and determines the area of the earth’s surface, which is ‘seen’ from a given
altitude.”179 The total area within a field of view is known as a
swath.180 The nadir point is the imaginary point that touches the
earth when “a perpendicular line [is drawn] from the sensor to the
ground.”181 If the sensor is pointed at the earth at other than a perpendicular angle relative to its platform, this is called oblique or
off-nadir viewing.182 The degree of oblique viewing is called angle
of view. Swath size increases as the altitude from the sensor to the
earth increases or angle of view becomes more oblique.183
Once an image is captured, its resolution can be distinguished
in four ways. Spectral resolution refers to the range of the electromagnetic spectrum captured by the sensor.184 For the purposes of

178. The imaging technologies discussed in this section are only those available to civilians. United States law enforcement agencies, other government agencies, and the military
have access to much more advanced surveillance aircraft and satellite imaging technologies.
See Patrick Korody, Note, Satellite Surveillance Within U.S. Borders, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627,
1627 (2004); State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-0049, slip op. at 5–6 (D.N.D. July 31, 2012)
(describing the North Dakota sheriff’s use of a Predator drone with infrared capabilities
operated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). The use of government technologies is beyond the scope of analysis of this Article.
179. BUSADEB BHATTA, REMOTE SENSING AND GIS 53 (2d ed. 2011).
180. Id. at 51.
181. Id. at 52.
182. Id.
183. Chunyuan Wang, Ye Zhang, Yang Wu & Yanfeng Gu, Highly Accurate Geometric
Correction for Seriously Oblique Aero Remote Sensing Image Based on the Piecewise Polynomial Model, 2 J. COMPUTATIONAL INF. SYS. 342 (2011); see Kass Green, Russell B. Congalton
& Mark Tukeman, IMAGERY AND GIS (2017).
184. BHATTA, supra note 179, at 55.
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this discussion, the spectral resolution in question is the visible
light spectrum.185 Radiometric resolution describes a sensor’s “ability to discriminate very slight differences in energy.”186 It is expressed in base 2, so an 8-bit radiometric resolution would generate 28 (256) energy frequencies, i.e., shades of color. High
radiometric resolutions do not necessarily generate “better” images
in humans’ eyes because our ability to differentiate among shades
is rather limited, particularly in grayscale.187
Most relevant for this discussion are spatial resolution and temporal resolution. Spatial resolution describes the amount of detail
visible in an image by referring “to the size of the smallest possible
feature that can be detected.”188 It is expressed as the area on the
ground—ground sampling distance (“GSD”)—found in the smallest
resolution cell, or pixel, of an image. For example, a GSD of 2.6
centimeters per pixel allows for the clear reading of the lettering
in a parking lot from an altitude of 180 feet.189 Temporal resolution
refers to the frequency with which a sensor “records imagery of a
particular area.”190 Temporal resolution is expressed in units of
time.
2. Distinguishing Swath Size and Field of View
Drones operate differently than manned aircraft.191 Drones’
cameras often come mounted on gimbals which allow for motion of
the camera independent from the motion of the drone.192 This
means that the drone camera can have a field of view other than
perpendicular from the drone to the ground. This oblique sensing
can be achieved with manned aircraft and satellites as well. But,
because drones can lawfully operate at much lower altitudes, a
drone’s swath will be smaller than that of a manned aircraft or a

185. Tour of the Electromagnetic Spectrum, NASA SCI., https://science.nasa.gov/ems/09_v
isiblelight [https://perma.cc/2ZES-9UNL].
186. BHATTA, supra note 179, at 56.
187. Id. at 56–57.
188. Id. at 53.
189. Resolution: Understanding Resolution, DRONEDEPLOY, https://support.dronedepl
oy.com/docs/resolution [https://perma.cc/7PXW-LL5F].
190. BHATTA, supra note 179, at 58.
191. See supra section III.A.
192. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
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satellite. A smaller swath increases the probability of a better spatial resolution—allowing for more detailed images.193
The ability for a drone to operate at lower altitudes dramatically
shifts the field of view of its sensor. An example helps illustrate the
significant difference between the field of view of a drone’s camera
and those of manned aircraft and satellites. A drone can hover over
a neighboring property at the exact height of someone’s window,
all while avoiding trespass.194 See Figure 1 below. Because of its
gimbal, the operator can direct the drone’s camera to make a visual
observation through the window. The field of view of the drone
camera would include the far wall of the room visible through the
window. With just a little practice195 the drone operator could take
advantage of the drone’s maneuverability and shift the field of view
of the camera around the room.196
Figure 1—Drone, Avoiding Trespass, Flying at Same Altitude as
Neighbor’s Windows197

193. Erich Seifert, Stefan Seifert, Holger Vogt, David Drew, Jan van Aardt, Anton
Kunneke & Thomas Seifert, Influence of Drone Altitude, Image Overlap, and Optical Sensor
Resolution on Multi-View Reconstruction of Forest Images, 11 REMOTE SENSING 1252, 1253
(2019).
194. See Scharf, supra note 23, at 1080.
195. See supra section III.A.3.
196. See supra section III.A.2.
197. Luxurious Contemporary Three Story Wood Siding Home Exterior in Bellevue,
SHUTTERSTOCK.COM, https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/luxurious-contemporarythreestory-wood-siding-home-704907307 [https://perma.cc/V8HD-952T] (drone image
added by author).
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The same geometry of image capture is not available to manned
aircraft or satellites. Even if a manned aircraft had a gimbaled
camera and an unimpeded view of the same window, the FAA requirements to keep at least 1000 feet of vertical distance and at
least 2000 feet of horizontal distance from the tallest structure198
would make it nearly impossible to fly at an altitude allowing its
angle of view to match that of the drone. A manned aircraft might
be able to capture an image that includes the window, but it would
have a much more limited field of view of the interior of the room.199
A satellite would have an even more difficult time capturing an
unimpeded view inside the window because of the incredible distance from its sensor to the interior of the room. Even if a satellite
could match the angle of view of a drone looking inside a window,
the resolution of the image would be severely diminished because
of the increased swath size at such an oblique angle.200
For these reasons, the swath size and nadir point of images captured by drones make them fundamentally distinct from those captured by manned aircraft and satellites.
3. Distinguishing Drone Images from Other Publicly Available
Images
Internet-based services such as Google Earth and Bing Maps
make images of people’s homes publicly available. These images
can be distinguished from drone-captured images in several ways.
The imagery on Google Earth and Bing Maps “is actually a mosaic
of many images from different time periods, different spatial resolutions (15 m [meter] to 10 cm [centimeter]) and multiple image
providers.”201 For views of the United States, most of the satellite
images are captured from the NASA/USGS Landsat 8 satellite202

198. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b) (2020).
199. See Green et al., supra note 183, at 57–60.
200. See id.; Wang et al., supra note 183, at 342.
201. Myroslava Lesiv, Linda See, Juan Carlos, Laso Bayas, Tobias Sturn, Dmitry
Schepaschenko, Mathias Karner, Inian Moorthy, Ian McCallum & Steffen Fritz, Characterizing the Spatial and Temporal Availability of Very High Resolution Satellite Imagery in
Google Earth and Microsoft Bing Maps as a Source of Reference Data, 7 LAND 118, 119
(2018), https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/7/4/118/htm [https://perma.cc/7KC5-G58F].
202. Id.; Sarah Perez, Google Earth and Maps Get Sharper Satellite Imagery with New
Update, TECHCRUNCH (June 27, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/27/google-earth-and
-maps-get-sharper-satellite-imagery-with-new-update/ [https://perma.cc/RK7S-PXNF].
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which offers at best a fifteen-meter GSD spatial resolution.203
Drones also offer a vastly superior spatial resolution compared to
publicly available satellite images. At about fifty feet of altitude, a
DJI Phantom 4 drone can achieve a GSD of at least 0.7 centimeters
per pixel with just its built-in camera.204 For context, this spatial
resolution would use approximately eighty five pixels to display an
average human eye,205 and facial recognition software only needs
about three pixels per eye to operate effectively.206 Because drones
can offer a spatial resolution at least 2000 times greater than most
publicly available satellite imagery, the potential privacy impact
of drone-captured images greatly exceeds that of satellites.
Both Google Earth and Bing Maps supplement satellite imagery
with aerial imagery from manned aircraft. Bing’s Bird’s Eye offers
aerial photographs of people’s homes taken at a 45-degree angle of
view from an altitude of 1000 feet.207 “This Bird’s Eye imagery is

203. Landsat 8, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://www.usgs.gov/land-resources/nli/lands
at/landsat-8?qt-science_support_page_related_con=0#qt-science_support_page_related_con
[https://perma.cc/DYA3-FHKJ].
204. Seifert et al., supra note 193, at 1256–57.
205. This calculation was made by using the dimensions of the human eye to calculate
the surface area of an ellipse (oval). Inessa Bekerman, Paul Gottlieb & Michael Vaiman,
Variation in Eyeball Diameter of the Healthy Adult, J. OPTHALMOLOGY (2014), https://www.
hindawi.com/journals/joph/2014/503645/ [https://perma.cc/56SQ-F9U6] (“The size of a[] human adult eye is approximately 24.2 mm (transverse[)] × 23.7 mm (sagittal[)] × 22.0–24.8
mm (axial) with no significant difference between sexes and age groups.”). Because the sagittal plane is used to measure the depth of a human being in body imaging, the other two
measurements are relevant to determining the area of the human eye. Basic Plane Mathematics of MRI, MY-MS.ORG, https://my-ms.org/mri_planes.htm [https://perma.cc/ZV3MUHLZ]. These dimensions provide the necessary figures to calculate the area of an ellipse.
Area of an Ellipse Calculator, KEISAN ONLINE CALCULATOR, https://keisan.casio.com/exec
/system/1223289167 [https://perma.cc/JQX7-6DKZ] (using 24.2 for a and 23.4 for b). The
result is approximately 1779 square millimeters of area for the eye at its largest cross section. Because the visible area of the eye is smaller than this cross section and is partially
covered by eye lids, let us assume that under normal circumstances the visible area of the
eye has one-third the area of this largest possible ellipse. The visible area of the eye therefore has an area of about 593 square millimeters. Dividing 0.7 centimeters (7 millimeters)
of spatial resolution, see supra note 189, into 593 square millimeters equals 84.7 pixels.
206. See Pei Li, Patrick J. Flynn, Loreto Prieto & Domingo Merry, Face Recognition in
Low Quality Images: A Survey, ACM COMPUTING SURVS., Apr. 2019, at 1, 19–21 (describing
facial recognition software success rates with a spatial resolution as small as twelve by fourteen pixels); Camera Resolution Validation, ROCHESTER INST. TECH. (citing Head Anthropometry, WIKIMEDIA, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/61/HeadAnthrop
ometry.JPG [https://perma.cc/6QNU-KF7E]), http://edge.rit.edu/edge/P13541/public/Work
ingDocuments/Camera%20Resolution%20Validation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UMB8-JEK3]
(describing the size of the average human head)).
207. We’ve Released New Bird’s Eye Imagery!, BING BLOGS (Jul. 11, 2019), https://blogs.
bing.com/maps/2019-07/we-ve-released-new-birds-eye-imagery [https://perma.cc/RA59-XT
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sub-10 CM [centimeter] GSD (ground sample distance), which . . .
support[s] more detailed levels of map zoom.”208 For a fee, Bing’s
worldwide coverage is limited to spatial resolution of thirty centimeters per pixel.209 Google Imagery, also a fee-based service, offers
up to fifteen centimeters per pixel spatial resolution.210 Accordingly, drones can offer a spatial resolution at least fourteen times
greater than publicly available aerial photography.211
Temporal resolution offers a strong distinction between images
captured by drones and those captured from aerial photographs
and satellite images. Drones can capture images at least daily if
not more frequently, making their temporal resolution instantaneous with live streaming during the course of a single flight212 and
just hours in between battery charges.213 The Landsat 8 satellite
has a temporal resolution of sixteen days,214 but Google and Bing
do not update their images that frequently.215 Publicly available
aerial images are captured at irregular intervals.216 Though not a
form of remote sensing because the camera platform is on the
ground at the moment of image capture, the “street views” offered
by Google Maps and Bing Maps display images taken once every
few years.217 These significant differences in temporal resolution
make the images captured by drones fundamentally different from
other publicly available aerial and satellite images.

K6]. Because Bing’s Bird’s Eye focuses on images of populated areas, the minimum safe
altitude for flight operations is 1000 feet. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b) (2020).
208. BING BLOGS, supra note 207.
209. Bing Maps API Features Overview, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/enus/maps/licensing/bing-maps-api-features-overview [https://perma.cc/D4L4-AYUA].
210. What Are the Technical Specifications for Google Imagery?, GOOGLE MAPS DATA
HELP, https://support.google.com/mapsdata/answer/6261838?hl=en [https://perma.cc/7JADGX95].
211. Services like EagleView, see supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text, may offer
the possibility of aerial photography with greater spatial resolutions. Such images, though,
would likely only be captured with specific instructions from the customer. Unless the images are of property in which the customer has a legal interest, there may be other protections deterring such image capture of strangers’ homes. See, e.g., infra note 382.
212. Gonzalez, supra note 34, at 295.
213. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text.
214. Landsat 8, supra note 203.
215. See Lesiv et al., supra note 201, at 3–5.
216. See id.
217. See J.D. Biersdorfer, Finding the Date on a Map Image, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/technology/personaltech/finding-the-date-on-a-map-i
mage.html [https://perma.cc/93HS-QJ5W]; Sources of Photography, GOOGLE MAPS, https://
www.google.com/streetview/explore/ [https://perma.cc/4X5L-V9D2].
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Publicly available images of the author’s home help illustrate
the extent of these differences. The street view images of his home
were captured several years before he moved in. The nadir satellite
imagery is several years old because of changes in vegetation.
Though Bing’s Bird’s Eye imagery has a spatial resolution with approximately 4-centimeter GSD, these images of his home were captured sometime in the spring of 2019. The Google Earth 3D imagery features a tree that is no longer in the yard. When a drone
captures an image, the spatial and temporal resolution are consistent. Drone image capture, accordingly, is a vastly more accurate representation of someone’s home than publicly available
satellite and aerial photographs. The difference in the representativeness of the image is akin to the distinction between an impressionist-style painting and a polaroid photograph inscribed with the
date the picture was taken.
C. Distinguishing Drones from Neighbors’ Elevated Vantage
Points
All these distinctions among images captured from drones,
manned aircraft, and satellites218 can be summarized as follows:
drones can operate at angles and in proximities to the objects captured in images that are unavailable to other image capture technologies. When considering the privacy of the home,219 only a
neighbor’s elevated vantage points—windows, balconies, roofs,
treehouses—offer a similar field of view and proximity. Drones can
operate in this same airspace. Before continuing the discussion, it
is important to define some key terms.
The person in question is the occupant. This term includes all
parties who are on property lawfully, regardless of the scope of
their authority to be there.220 The totality of the property is called
the home.221 This includes the structure in which the occupant has
the greatest refuge from public observations—the dwelling.222 Still

218. See Lesiv et al., supra note 201, at 118 (publicly available images from satellites).
219. See infra Part IV.
220. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Liability for Injury to Guest in Home or Similar
Premises, 25 A.L.R.2d 598, §§ 3–6 (1952).
221. See Francis C. Amendola et al., Annotation, House; Home; Home Place; Building;
Dwelling; Homestead; and Similar Terms, 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1263 (Dec. 2020).
222. Id.
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part of the home, the area immediately around the dwelling is
called the curtilage.223
A neighbor can be understood as the minimum definition of the
public—the single someone that is not an occupant of the home but
can observe at least part of the dwelling or curtilage shielded from
the view of all others.224 The field of view from a neighbor’s elevated
vantage points may offer a look directly into the dwelling or curtilage unavailable from ground level, manned aircraft, or satellites.
From these places, privacy fences offer little visual obstruction and
second-story rooms can be observed at the neighbor’s eye level.
Such observations posts are permanent, or at least very slow to
change. In addressing the question, “can the neighbor see into the
occupant’s home,” there is a balance of information.225 With a quick
glance from her curtilage or out her bedroom window, the occupant
can see her neighbor’s windows, roof, balconies, even treehouses. If
someone is there, then the occupant knows the neighbor can observe her in that moment. If someone is not there, the occupant is
free from the neighbor’s visual observations.
The occupant’s tolerance for visual observation from the neighbor will dictate her response to this information. Seeking to assure
privacy for a moment, the occupant might block her windows by
drawing the curtains.226 Because the neighbor’s elevated vantage
points are fixed, an occupant has all the information she needs to
erect permanent barriers that preserve her desired level of privacy.
Awnings and frosted glass offer a more permanent solution for the

223. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
224. See Bruce G. Brener, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25
VAL. U. L. REV. 383, 388–92 (1991) (discussing cases of observations from neighbor’s windows where no Fourth Amendment search was found); Stuart P. Green, To See and Be Seen:
Reconstructing the Law of Voyeurism and Exhibition, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203, 209–11
(2018) (distinguishing mere observations or displays through a home’s windows from criminal acts of voyeurism and exhibition, respectively, based on the observer’s or occupant’s
illegal intent). By considering a neighbor “the public,” the police can adopt the neighbor’s
vantage point to conduct a variety of warrantless searches. See, e.g., Gregory E. Sopkin, The
Police Have Become Our Nosy Neighbors: Florida v. Riley and Other Supreme Court Deviations from Katz, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 407 (1991).
225. See Xiaodong Jiang, Jason I. Horye & James A. Landay, Approximate Information
Flows: Socially-Based Modeling of Privacy in Ubiquitous Computing, UBICOMP 2002, Sept.
2002, at 176–77.
226. Id. at 181 (“[S]ocial norms have evolved to the extent that most people would . . .
shield their windows.”).
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home.227 To create private spaces in a curtilage already surrounded
by a privacy fence an occupant might strategically plant trees,228
erect a taller fence,229 or build a roof over part of the curtilage.230
Drones present significant information asymmetries.231 Particularly when compared to a neighbor’s fixed vantage points, drones’
maneuverability and responsiveness to operator intent mean that
they can move freely through the air.232 The drone operator has
access to countless fields of view whenever she elects to fly. The
occupant now has no information about which field of view the
drone is using at any point in time. The precisely affixed awning,
the strategically planted tree, and the carefully constructed roofed
patio now offer no privacy protection.233
A drone’s undetectability compounds these information asymmetries.234 The information signals offered by the neighbor’s fixed
vantage points all but disappear. A quick glance out the window or
over the fence coveys all the information an occupant needs about
whether the neighbors can observe each other. If the neighbor’s
curtains are closed, the occupant is assured of freedom from observation even if her window treatments remain open, and vice versa.
Though there may be periods of time when both sets of window
treatments are open, an occupant needs only periodic glances out
at the neighbor’s fixed vantage points to determine if the neighbor
can see into the dwelling. Because of their size, low noise profile,
and unpredictable flight patterns, drones are very difficult to detect.235 Short of constantly peering out the window or scanning the
sky in multiple directions while outside, only keeping window

227. The British have codified such architectural features as necessary elements for assuring freedom from a neighbor’s visual observations. See Mike Dade, Planning: Solutions
to Overlooking Issues, BUILD IT (Sept. 6, 2020), https://www.self-build.co.uk/planning-overlooking/ [https://perma.cc/U5SH-LTPQ]; see also Privacy Lost Through Neighbours New
Window, BERGAGUE ABOGADOS (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.berdaguerabogados.com/neigh
bour-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/9BEQ-NCQE].
228. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989) (“[T]he contents of the greenhouse were
obscured from view from surrounding property by trees . . . .”).
229. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (describing the presence of a second,
taller privacy fence that blocked neighbors’ views of the curtilage).
230. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carroll, 99 Va. Cir. 241, 245 (2018).
231. Friedman, supra note 43, at 11.
232. See supra sections III.A.2, III.A.4.
233. Friedman, supra note 43, at 14–15.
234. See supra section III.A.5.
235. Id.
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treatments drawn or staying indoors can ensure the occupant of
freedom from unwanted visual observation.
To put it differently, no temporary solutions ensure freedom
from unwanted visual observations made by drones. These information asymmetries leave the occupant with a difficult choice:
forego her desired level of privacy or sacrifice her enjoyment of her
property by erecting “drone-proof” barriers to visual observation.
This is the exact choice that Justice Brennan warned of in his dissent in the helicopter overflight case, Florida v. Riley.236 “The question is not whether you or I must draw the blinds. . . . It is whether
you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time
we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not.”237 Because this question arose as a dissent in the context of observations
made via a helicopter, the issue is not unique to drones. Rather,
Justice Brennan simply pointed out a problem in U.S. privacy jurisprudence that drones highlight almost perfectly.
A neighbor’s fixed vantage points do not create the same issues.
For this reason, drones can be distinguished from a neighbor’s
fixed vantage points.
By distinguishing drones from other aircraft, image capture
technologies, and a neighbor’s fixed vantage points of visual observation, it is now possible to explain precisely how drones have a
unique impact on unwanted visual observations in and about the
home.

236. See 488 U.S. 445, 457, 460 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 464 (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974)). Several other authors discuss this aspect of Brennan’s
dissent in the context of other observation methods. Lynne M. Pochurek, From the Battlefront to the Homefront: Infrared Surveillance and the War on Drugs Place Privacy Under
Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 137, 147–48 (1994) (discussing infrared technologies); Merrick
D. Bernstein, “Intimate Details”: A Troubling New Fourth Amendment Standard for Government Surveillance Techniques, 46 DUKE L.J. 575, 598–99 (1996) (discussing observations
of a bedroom made through a skylight); Alfredo Garcia, “No Fetish” for Privacy, Fairness, or
Justice: Why William Rehnquist, Not Ken Starr, Was Responsible for William Jefferson Clinton’s Impeachment, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 511, 528–29 (2001) (discussing visual
observations made through a gap in the closed blinds of an apartment window); Margaret
Hu, Orwell’s 1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test, 92 WASH.
L. REV. 1819, 1873–75 (2017) (discussing use of new surveillance technologies generally).
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IV. DEFINING PRIVACY IN THE HOME—FREEDOM FROM VISUAL
OBSERVATION & THE DRONE DATA LIFECYCLE
For the purposes of this discussion, “privacy” means freedom
from visual observation in and about the home.238 After an introduction of key terms, this Part organizes non-drone-specific privacy protections spatially. Starting from the physical spaces inside
the home which have the greatest legal protections from being observed, the discussion moves physically outward to spaces with
fewer protections. The legal protections described here may be actionable in factual scenarios involving drones, but successful actions involving drones under these theories present significant
challenges.239
The legal protections discussed here focus on drone operations
by private actors.240 Government actors, though, might direct private drone operators or, at a later time, use the images captured
by private drone operators.241 A full picture of the protections
against private actors operating drones, therefore, must include
the government use of drones as well.
This definition of privacy strongly implicates two conceptions of
privacy: surveillance and secrecy; as well as two legal theories of
privacy: reasonable expectations and property rights. The legal
protections for privacy in each of these spaces are discussed within
the conceptual and theoretical frameworks. Building on this, a discussion of privacy expectations in drone data concludes the Part.

238. See supra Part I.
239. Scharf, supra note 23, at 1100–01; Farber, supra note 73, at 380; Gonzalez, supra
note 34, at 310; Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 165 (2015);
see also Iva Todorova, Note, The Sky Is the Limit: UAVs by Private Actors and the Implications to Common-Law Privacy, 10 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 803, 828–29 (2015).
240. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE
REGARDING DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES TO PROTECT CERTAIN FACILITIES OR ASSETS FROM
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT AND UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 11 (Apr. 13, 2020) (“Department
components may maintain records of communications to or from unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft systems intercepted or acquired under authority of the Act . . . .”).
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A. Key Terms
The terms occupant, home, dwelling, and curtilage are defined
above.242 Anything beyond the scope of the curtilage is called open
fields.243 The concept of trespass most applicable to drones is trespass quare clausum fregit.244 This definition of trespass recognizes
a “direct causal relation between the conduct of the actor and the
intrusion of the foreign matter upon the possessor’s land . . . sufficient to create a trespass.”245
B. A Spatial Tour of Privacy Interests in the Home
1. Parts of the Interior of the Dwelling Not Visible to the Public
The parts of the interior of the dwelling that are not visible to
the public enjoy the highest level of privacy protections. A drone
would have either to trespass into the dwelling or use extra sensory
(beyond the visible light spectrum) remote-sensing technologies to
make a visual observation of these spaces. Under either set of circumstances, the occupant of the home could pursue recourse
against a private drone operator under criminal statutes,246 civil
trespass,247 and possibly even the privacy torts of intrusion upon
seclusion and publicity given to private life.248 A government actor
using a drone would need a warrant both to enter these spaces249
and to use extra sensory technology250 to make a visual observation
of these portions of the dwelling not otherwise visible to the public
view.
Depending on the features of one’s dwelling, drones may be able
to make visual observations of places not otherwise visible to the
public. A low window might sit under an awning and behind a privacy fence. It offers no view of public spaces. This window is not
242. See supra notes 220–23 and accompanying text.
243. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
244. Benjamin D. Mathews, Comment, Potential Tort Liability for Personal Use of Drone
Aircraft, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 573, 592 (2015).
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 7, topic 2, scope note (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
246. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.215, .245.
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
248. Id. §§ 652B, 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
249. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012).
250. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 276, 234 (2001).
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visible to the public, not even the neighbor on the other side of the
privacy fence. With a drone, though, the neighbor could achieve a
field of view into the window by flying on her own property over
the height of the privacy fence but under the height of the awning.
If low overflight via drone does not constitute trespass,251 the
neighbor may be able to access additional fields of view from the
occupant’s curtilage. A drone, therefore, presents a unique means
of making unwanted visual observations of interior spaces of a
dwelling not otherwise visible to the public.
2. Parts of the Interior of the Dwelling Possibly Visible to the
Public
The next highest level of privacy protections covers places like
bedrooms and bathrooms. These places are recognized as especially private, even if they are potentially capable of visual observation from a public vantage point.252 A bedroom window may overlook a neighbor’s window, thereby allowing for the possibility of
visual observations by drone from a public vantage point. Even if
the occupant does not specifically prevent visual observations from
the public, society recognizes that these places enjoy a heightened
level of privacy protection because occupants are likely to be nude
or intimate in such places.253
Privacy interests may be protected from private actors by voyeurism statutes254 and potentially even the privacy torts,255 even
if the drone is flying in a public space. In some states, though, the
question of whether the occupant attempted to prevent visual observations of these particularly private spaces (i.e., by closing the
curtains)256 may be relevant. If the spaces in the dwelling capable
of visual observations from a public vantage point are not generally
251. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 158–159 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 493.103.
252. See Scharf, supra note 23, at 1089 n.185 and accompanying text.
253. See id.
254. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1171. In this Article
the term “voyeurism statutes” is used to refer to the class of laws that makes it a criminal
offense to make visual observations of others. This includes the crimes of voyeurism, surveillance, peeping Tom, and invasion of privacy. Regardless of how the crime is named, a
necessary element of each of these crimes includes making unwanted visual observations.
255. See ALISSA M. DOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RES. SERV., R42940,
INTEGRATION OF DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 14–17 (2013).
256. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189a.
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considered especially private, like a kitchen or a second-story TV
room, then the occupant’s efforts to shield the space from view determines the availability of privacy protections from unwanted civilian observers.257
In other words, if the blinds are down privacy protections exist,
but if they are open the same privacy protections from private actors are not available.258 The occupant’s privacy expectations in
these spaces are irrelevant to the question of a government actor’s
visual observations from a public vantage point.259 For government
actors making visual observations from a public vantage point the
most relevant question is whether the interior of the dwelling is in
“plain view.”260
Drones also have a unique impact on privacy in spaces possibly
visible to the public. A quick look out an open window, and the occupant knows if the neighbor’s blinds are open or if the neighbor is
on her balcony. She can shield the interior of her dwelling from
public view by closing her own curtains. Especially when compared
to a neighbor’s fixed vantage points, drones are nearly undetectable.261 The occupant would have to see or hear a drone in flight to
know that it is making observations.262 Without this piece of information, the occupant might not close her curtains. Accordingly, she
would enjoy fewer legal protections from unwanted visual observations made via drone.
The informational asymmetries presented by drones, therefore,
have a unique impact on privacy in parts of the dwelling possibly
visible to the public. But, because this exact issue arose over thirty
years ago relative to helicopter operations,263 it is difficult to argue
that drones present a novel threat to privacy. Rather, drones
simply highlight a preexisting issue in U.S. privacy jurisprudence.

257. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7507.1(a)(2), with id. § 7507.1(a)(1).
258. See, e.g., 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 70.35(d)(10).
259. See United States v. Gonzales-Barrera, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (D. Ariz. 2003) (looking
into a bedroom window incident to knocking on the front door). But see People v. Camacho,
3 P.3d 878 (Cal. 2000) (finding that an officer looking into an uncovered window did not
make the observation from a public vantage point).
260. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
261. See supra section III.B.5.
262. See supra section III.C.
263. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
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3. Portions of the Curtilage Not Visible from the Ground and Not
Visible the Air
Moving to the outside of the dwelling,264 the portions of the curtilage not visible both from the ground and not visible from the air
receive the next highest level of privacy protection. These spaces
might be understood as roofed structures within a yard that is surrounded by a privacy fence. Such structures might include sun
porches, covered patios, pergolas, gazebos, and foliage covered trellises. The space underneath the roof of the structure is not visible
to observations made from a public space either on the ground or
from overhead positions. Under these structures an occupant seeks
to enjoy a semi-open space within the curtilage but has taken clear
measures to assert a privacy interest both from the ground, and
elevated positions, including the air. From the ground, the privacy
fence necessitates trespass to make visual observations.265
In the overflight cases of homes—Ciraolo and Riley—the Supreme Court reasoned that manned airways, as low as 400 feet in
altitude, constitute a public vantage point.266 Though drones fly at
lower altitudes, they could operate in such a way that their fields
of view are similar to those of manned aircraft,267 then visual observations from above are rendered nearly impossible because of
the roof-like cover over these structures.268 If constructed properly,
the space underneath these structures may not even be visible
from elevated fixed vantage points on a neighbor’s property.
A drone could operate at such a height and location relative to
the ground that its camera has a field of view that is higher than
the fence but lower than the elevation of the roof of the structure
in question. See Figure 2 below. If the drone crosses over the property line in question to achieve this field of view, that may constitute trespass.269 If a drone operates from a public (nonprivate) vantage point, then only certain voyeurism statutes270 and the privacy
264. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
265. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
266. Id.; Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
267. See supra sections III.A, III.B.2.
268. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 447 (holding that visual observations from the air did not
constitute Fourth Amendment search because a structure in the curtilage was partially uncovered).
269. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) §§ 158–159 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
270. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2605.
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torts271 would potentially offer protection from unwanted visual observations by private actors. The specific factual circumstances
would dictate whether the Fourth Amendment would provide privacy protection from such visual observations by a government actor.272 Absent circumstances that would trigger any of these protections, though, drones have a unique impact on privacy because
they offer a field of view of the curtilage unavailable by other
means.
Figure 2—Drone-Captured Image of Back Yard with Privacy Fence and
Covered Porch273

This set of circumstances provides the most support for assertions by others that drones have significantly impacted privacy,

271. See DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 255, at 14–17.
272. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–14 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
see also Blitz et al., supra note 24, at 140.
273. Darren Kall, Neighborhood Drone Goes Sky High, YOUTUBE (Mar. 25, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FaUFOfJ8mYM [https://perma.cc/A925-QRQM] (“Flying around my neighborhood, ‘stay on the streets.’”).
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particularly from warrantless observations by government actors.274 By placing a roofed but unwalled structured behind a privacy fence, an occupant can largely be free from visual observations from manned aircraft. If an occupant wants to avoid visual
observations from drones in parts of her curtilage, Ciraolo and Riley could effectively require that such spaces be moved indoors—
covered with roofs and walls that obscure all possible visual observations because drones can lawfully achieve almost any field of
view. The occupant must choose between enjoyment of her curtilage as an outdoor space and freedom from visual observation.275
Drones, therefore, have a unique impact on privacy under these
circumstances.
These circumstances, though, are not very common. Drones with
a field of view over privacy fences but under the roofs of unwalled
structures might catch a glimpse of a patio set, an outdoor kitchen,
or winter vegetables in a high tunnel. Except for outdoor hot tubs,
these are not spaces where people tend to expect much more privacy than what is already achieved by erecting a privacy fence.
People build these roofed but unwalled structures to enjoy some
shade in their back yard. The net effect in the application of the
privacy torts and voyeurism statutes, therefore, is minimal. Accordingly, though drones have a unique impact on privacy under
these circumstances, claims that drones can have a significant impact on privacy simply lack factual support.
4. Portions of the Curtilage Possibly Visible to the Public
If located inside a privacy fence, roofed but windowed outbuildings such as garages, sheds, and treehouses enjoy a lower level of
privacy protections. Making observations from the ground, it
would be difficult to see inside the windows of such structures. Like
with other roofed structures inside the privacy fence,276 the location of a drone making the visual observation would determine
whether the occupant can use trespass as a recourse against such
observations. If a government actor trespasses to make these observations, it is likely that the occupant could assert Fourth

274.
275.
276.

See supra notes 3–4; Spelman, supra note 60, at 402.
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 464 (1989); see also supra note 237.
See supra section IV.B.3.
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Amendment protections. Trespassory observations by private actors could also be actionable.
However, the occupant likely has a diminished expectation of
privacy in these types of structures, particularly from visual observations by government actors.277 If either a government actor or a
private party makes visual observations without trespass, it would
be difficult to assert any privacy protections. Because of a diminished expectation of privacy in such places, the occupant’s successful use of voyeurism laws or the privacy torts would rely on a very
particular set of circumstances.
Treehouses, though, present an interesting case regarding freedom from visual observation. Due to a treehouse’s elevation, a public vantage point at ground level would offer a limited field of view
of the interior of the treehouse. A public vantage point of a similar
height, like a neighbor’s second-story window, might offer a public
view into the treehouse. Assuming there is no public vantage point
from a similar height, then the interior of the treehouse would effectively be private. Visual observations would likely necessitate
trespass.
A drone, though, could easily achieve the necessary altitude and
observe the interior of the treehouse without trespassing. Despite
diminished privacy expectations in it generally, a treehouse is considered a “child’s playhouse . . . built in a tree.”278 Children are
sometimes afforded greater privacy protections than adults.279 Accordingly, unwanted visual observations of children in treehouses
made by drone may be actionable against private actors.280 In the
absence of another public vantage point, therefore, a drone could
have a unique impact on a child’s privacy in a treehouse.

277. See, e.g., State v. Bovat, 224 A.3d 103 (Vt. 2019) (discussing visual observations of
a garage); United States v. Longie, 370 F. Supp. 2d 941 (D.N.D. 2005) (discussing visual
observations of a shed); Talley v. Florida, 581 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding
an expectation of privacy in a treehouse occupied as a primary dwelling).
278. Tree-House no. 2, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
279. See Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home: When
Parental Authority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 109 (2011).
280. E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283(B)(4).
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5. Portions of the Curtilage Not Visible from the Ground or Not
Visible from the Air, but Not Both; Open Fields
The areas shielded from ground level visual observations from a
public location enjoy a very low level of privacy protection. A privacy fence could evince the occupant’s desire to be free from ground
level visual observations around a back yard, for example. Visually
observing such spaces from the ground would likely necessitate
trespass. But, making visual observations of such spaces from the
air would not constitute a trespass.281 Relative to the operations of
a drone, therefore, visual observations could be made from some
public vantage point that would not require trespass, and therefore
would not limit a government actor. Because some public vantage
point of these spaces would always be available, it would require a
fact-intensive analysis to determine whether the occupant had
enough of an expectation of privacy to find recourse against private
actors under the voyeurism statutes or privacy torts.282
Similarly, areas shielded from aerial observation but not ground
level observation probably enjoy no privacy protections. For such
structures, like car ports or porches covered with an awning, the
occupant would only be able to assert a privacy interest against
aerial observations. Visual observations from public vantage
points on the ground would always be available. The occupant,
therefore, likely has no recourse against either government actors
or private actors making visual observations of these spaces.283
For spaces visible from either the ground or the air, but not both,
an occupant enjoys little legal protections from visual observations.
Beyond the curtilage, if a home is large enough, a home’s open
fields also have no protections from unwanted visual observations
by government actors.284 Trespass actions, though, may be brought
against private actors.285 In all these spaces, drones offer no unique
impact on privacy.

281. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986).
282. See DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 255, at 20–21.
283. See Villasenor, supra note 11, at 502–03.
284. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S.
861, 865 (1974).
285. See infra section V.B.1.
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6. Other Protections from Visual Observations
If an occupant has erected a privacy fence, the system of zoning
rules and housing covenants also offers an occupant some protection from unwanted visual observations of the home. As Troy Rule
has observed, “Height restrictions in zoning ordinances and private subdivision covenants further strengthen landowners’ certainty about their degree of privacy on their parcels by restricting
neighbors’ ability to erect structures that could create new vantage
points for peering over trees or fences.”286
On a case-by-case basis, the occupant could also acquire a light
and air easement from a neighboring property. This would grant
the occupant an interest in the unobstructed “passage of light and
air over the property of another.”287 In combination with a privacy
fence, such an easement would prevent the neighbor from building
structures that offer a vantage point for visual observations of the
occupant’s home. These protections for visual observation, though,
are not unique to drones.
Additionally, if another’s drone use bothers the occupant such
that it diminishes her enjoyment and use of her home, the occupant
may be able to bring a private nuisance claim.288 Among the elements the occupant would typically have to prove for a successful
private nuisance claim, the drone use would have to be repeated
(not just a single incident) and the manner of operation of the drone
would have to be generally considered offensive.289 Offensive behavior via drone may include capturing images of parts of the home
that are generally considered private, thereby causing unreasonable injury.290 A successful private nuisance claim would be difficult,291 but could prevent future visual observations of the occupant’s home. Private nuisance actions, though, are not unique to
drones.

286. Rule, supra note 239, at 189.
287. 6 MILLER & STARR CAL. REAL EST. § 17:35 (4th ed. 2015).
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
289. Id. §§ 821D, F.
290. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982); see Farber, supra note 73, at 395.
291. See Farber, supra note 73, at 395.
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A negative drone avigation easement—called here a “Teddy
Easement”292—could limit the occupants of nearby properties from
making visual observations from the air space over their respective
properties. Avigation easements typically authorize manned aircraft to fly at otherwise trespassory altitudes, particularly in takeoff and landing zones of airports.293 A Teddy Easement could prevent drones from flying over the burdened properties, thereby stopping drones from accessing otherwise public vantage points that
allow visual observations of the easement holder’s (beneficiary’s)
home. A Teddy Easement would be a legal protection unique to
drones. The author, however, has not found any instance of such
an easement burdening a property.
7. Shifting Focus from Operations to Data Gathering
Drones potentially have a unique impact on privacy in four
spaces in and around the home: (1) parts of the interior of the
dwelling not otherwise visible to the public; (2) parts of the interior
of the dwelling possibly visible to the public; (3) portions of the curtilage not visible from the ground and not visible from the air; and
(4) in the absence of another public vantage point, treehouses used
by children. These spaces represent a rather limited set of factual
circumstances. Accordingly, assertions that the unique operating
capabilities of drones have a significant impact on privacy simply
lack factual support.

292. This legal solution was inspired by the author’s dog—Teddy. Though there are no
trees or structures in the author’s yard where one might find a squirrel, the neighboring
yards have several tall trees, utility poles, and power lines. Squirrels run amok in the neighbors’ trees and across their power lines. Upon sensing them, Teddy prowls the author’s
fence, running, whining, and barking at all hours. The author has had no success explaining
to Teddy that the squirrels are not on his property and he has no chance of catching them.
The author often wonders, “how can I stop the squirrels?,” for Teddy is a perfect dog and
does not need to change in any way. If only there were an anti-squirrel easement! Teddy
and the squirrels bear a striking resemblance to drones making visual observations of an
occupant’s home. From this perspective, the occupant should not need to change anything
about her home. Rather, how could she ensure that drones do not operate over neighboring
properties such that they could make unwanted visual observations of her home?
293. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., SURFACE AND OVERHEAD AVIGATION EASEMENT 1 (2012);
Luis G. Zambrano, Comment, Balancing the Rights of Landowners with the Needs of Airports: The Continuing Battle over Noise, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 445, 480–84 (2000); see also
SANTA CLARA CTY. AIRPORT & LAND USE COMM’N, COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN SANTA
CLARA COUNTY: HELIPORTS 4-9, 5-2 (2015).
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Drones, though, are primarily data collection devices.294
Whether the captured image is unique to drones’ operating abilities or not, the privacy impact of drones must consider the lifecycle
of drone-captured data. A discussion about conceptions and theories of privacy helps explain the extent to which these legal approaches protect the home from unwanted visual observations
from drones. With this understanding, the impact of drone data on
the third-party doctrine can be better understood.
C. Conceptions and Theories of Privacy
This discussion of conceptions and theories of privacy seeks to
explain the reasoning behind the protections from unwanted visual
observations an occupant enjoys in and around the home. These
conceptions and theories may be articulated through Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, but they are important to understanding protections against drone operations by private actors. Occupants seeking to protect themselves from drones making unwanted
visual observations in the home cannot discriminate between the
private drone operators and government drone operators.295 Additionally, government actors may commandeer private drone operators or, at a later time, use the images captured by civilian drone
operations.296 Accordingly, though the reasoning behind these privacy protections may be articulated in the context of visual observations by government actors, this reasoning also applies to the
protections against private actors.
1. Property Theory of Privacy
One legal theory of privacy interests comes from the realm of
property. Property rights serve to protect one’s privacy interests
mainly by physically excluding others.297 Violation of this exclusion
is considered trespass. If someone trespasses into the occupant’s
294. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (discussing the police use of a private aircraft to make visual observations); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448, 450–51 (1989) (arguing that observations by a
government helicopter in public airspace did not constitute a search because privately operated helicopters could also fly there).
296. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
297. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12, 387 (1978); see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 995 (2004).
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home, then the property theory of privacy would serve only indirectly to prevent visual observations. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has found that privacy interests may be violated when the
government conducts searches that effectively require physical intrusion upon private spaces.298 The property theory of privacy,
therefore, does not protect against visual observations of the home
from public (nonprivate) vantage points.299
The property theory of privacy offers the basis for privacy protections achieved through zoning laws, negative drone avigation
easements, and the private nuisance cause of action.300 Absent
these specific circumstances, the steps an occupant takes to prevent visual observations from the public become important. If
someone is in a public space and she happens to make a visual observation of the interior of a home, then it is not clear that the occupant has legal recourse against those making such visual observations. Observations of spaces shielded from public view become
impossible without effectively committing trespass. The property
theory, therefore, helps explain the legal protections only for parts
of the interior of the dwelling not visible to the public except by
trespass. Via drone, observations of all other parts of the home
might be made without trespass. It is not clear, therefore, that the
property theory supports protections against unwanted visual observations in any other area of the home.
2. Privacy as Surveillance
If privacy is understood as freedom from unwanted visual observation in and about the home, this strongly implicates the conception of privacy as surveillance. Surveillance can be understood as
the collection of information about a person or place.301 Surveil-

298. United States v. Jones, 556 U.S. 400, 407–08 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001).
299. Riley, 488 U.S. at 499–50; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14; Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
300. See supra section IV.B.6.
301. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490–91 (2006);
Surveillance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2013).
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lance focuses on the actions of the observer, not necessarily the interests of the party being observed.302 Surveillance may be indiscriminate or specifically targeted at the home or occupant in question.303 If the home is subject to surveillance by drone it means that
the occupant’s privacy interest is impinged at the moment of image
capture.304
Like the property theory of privacy, surveillance helps explain
trespass as a privacy protection. Accordingly, surveillance fully
supports privacy protections only for parts of the interior of the
dwelling not visible to the public. Except for voyeurism statutes
with specific intent requirements that eliminate the occupant’s
burden to block all visual observation from public spaces,305 surveillance only helps explain legal protections of other areas of the
home to the extent that the occupant has shielded those spaces
from public view. If visual observation via drone is possible from a
public vantage point, the surveillance conception of privacy offers
almost no protection from unwanted visual observations in and
around the home.
3. Reasonable Expectations Theory of Privacy306
The concurring opinion by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United
States articulated the reasonable expectations theory of privacy.307
Harlan articulated a test: “[t]here is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of

302. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 431–32
(1997) (discussing the merits of various surveillance techniques based on the extent to which
the observer intrudes upon the observed, not the privacy expectations of the observed).
303. Villasenor, supra note 11, at 501–03.
304. See id. at 494.
305. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08 (LexisNexis 2009); see also supra note 254
and accompanying text.
306. Both the reasonable expectations and property theories of privacy interests have
been hotly debated by the Court and scholars. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(2012); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2244 n.10 (2018). Though the Court in
Jones seems to have moved away from the reasonable expectations theory, it is not clear
that this basis for privacy protections has been completely abandoned. 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Jeramie D. Scott, Drone Surveillance: The FAA’s Obligation to Respond to the Privacy Risks, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767, 784–85 (2017).
307. Ian F. Rothfuss, Comment, An Economic Perspective on the Privacy Implication of
Domestic Drone Surveillance, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 441, 448 (2014).
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privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”308 In applying the Harlan test
to freedom from visual observation in the home, the first question
is whether the occupant has subjectively demonstrated an expectation of privacy. In the case of visual observations made by drones,
this subjective demonstration must be tangible. Privacy fences,
closed window treatments, and roofed outdoor spaces all serve to
indicate that the occupant expects to be free from visual observation in and around her dwelling. Society has generally considered
the home the most private of spaces.309 Expectations of freedom
from observation in and around the home, therefore, are reasonable.
When the occupant has erected barriers to visual observation
from public vantage points, the reasonable expectations theory
also helps explain trespass as a privacy protection. Unlike with the
property theory and the surveillance conceptions, an occupant establishes her expectation of privacy simply by erecting some barrier. It is not necessary to shield all possible public views. This
eliminates the need for an observer to trespass to justify recourse
against unwanted visual observations. An occupant, therefore,
may use many of the voyeurism statutes310 as well as the privacy
torts to advocate her privacy interests. For spaces that are possibly
visible from the public, either in the dwelling or in the curtilage,
the reasonable expectations theory explains why privacy protections against visual observations made by drones operating in public spaces could still be used.
4. Privacy as Secrecy
The secrecy conception of privacy focuses on an individual’s ability to keep from disclosure information about herself.311 Unlike
surveillance, secrecy focuses on the expectations of the observed,

308. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
309. See Kyllo v. United Sates, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).
310. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115(2)(a)(ii).
311. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON III, CONG. RES. SERV., R43965, DOMESTIC DRONES AND
PRIVACY: A PRIMER 7 (Mar. 30, 2015).
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not the actions of the observer.312 And unlike the reasonable expectations theory of privacy, an occupant does not even necessarily
need to erect barriers specifically to prevent visual observations.
For example, portions of someone’s body not typically exposed to
the public may constitute private information about a person. Or,
information about a child may be considered de facto private information. If an adult is in her bedroom or bathroom but the curtains
are open, secrecy helps explain why she may still have recourse
against a drone operator making unwanted visual observations under some voyeurism statutes.313 Privacy interests may be advocated through the privacy torts even if visual observations of places
other than the bedroom or bathroom, such as the fenced-in back
yard, are possible from a public vantage point.314 Protections from
unwanted visual observations of children can also be explained by
this conception of privacy.
D. Third-Party Doctrine and Drone Data Flows
These theoretical and conceptual understandings of legal protections offered against unwanted visual observations made by drones
help explain the legal status of drone data. As discussed above,
drones are primarily data collection devices.315 The data in question, for the purposes of this Article, are images of the home and
its occupants.316 Drone software programs nearly automatically
share drone images with the drone software provider.317 Once in
the hands of the drone software provider, the images are considered both shared and a business record.318
From the perspective of an occupant’s privacy interests, business
records fall under the third-party doctrine. Though it has taken
several forms in Supreme Court jurisprudence,319 the third-party
doctrine maintains that one cannot assert a privacy interest over
312. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan, Ivan Skorvanek,
Tomislav Chokrevski & Maša Galič, A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 551–52
(2017).
313. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-11-91(b)(1).
314. See, e.g., Mangelluzzi v. Morley, 40 N.E.3d 588, 594–95 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
315. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
316. See supra section IV.B.
317. See supra note 17.
318. See Aldrich, supra note 18, at 5.
319. See Blitz et al., supra note 24, at 65 n.76.
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something that has been knowingly shared with a third party.320
Without a privacy interest in the drone-captured images, the occupant cannot seek Fourth Amendment protections against government use of the images and is less likely to be successful in private
causes of action. The default state of many drone software programs is to store drone-captured images remotely,321 and the drone
software provider even potentially sells it.322 The different conceptions and legal theories of privacy illustrate the challenges the
third-party doctrine presents to an occupant asserting a privacy
interest in drone-captured data.
As discussed, the property theory of privacy only protects
against visual observations by drone to the extent that drone operations involve trespass.323 The occupant has no privacy interest in
the drone-captured images taken from a public vantage point. Considering that drones can access countless fields of view without
committing trespass, an occupant must keep her blinds closed and
build walls and roofs over all parts of her curtilage she intends to
keep private.324 Drones did not create this difficult choice, rather
they simply take the reasoning behind a trespass-based privacy jurisprudence to its logical extreme. From the perspective of the
third-party doctrine, the occupant has no privacy interest in any
drone-captured images of any part of her property captured without trespass. The third-party doctrine prevents her from stopping
the drone software provider from keeping, sharing, or selling such
images of her home.
The surveillance conception indicates that privacy interests are
diminished at the moment of image capture.325 The occupant of a
home, therefore, would effectively have to make her home impervious to surveillance from a public vantage point to have a privacy
320. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
321. See THOMPSON, supra note 311, at 8–10. Even DroneDeploy, a drone data management system that works independently of drone operating software, automatically stores
drone-captured data in its own data environment. Security and Compliance, DRONEDEPLOY
(Apr. 7, 2018), https://support.dronedeploy.com/docs/security-and-compliance [https://perm
a.cc/K9PA-KANU].
322. See Vacek, supra note 7, at 139; Scott, supra note 306, at 785–88; About, UNMANNED
ROBOTICS SYS. ANALYSIS, https://ursasecure.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/9FU3-AACK]
(“There is little regulatory or industry oversight or standards making process for the data
generated by . . . [drones].”).
323. See supra section IV.C.1.
324. See supra sections IV.B.2, IV.B.3; see also Spelman, supra note 60, at 402.
325. See supra section IV.C.2.
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interest in drone-captured images. Like with the property theory
perspective and the third-party doctrine, failure to erect such barriers prevents the occupant from asserting a privacy interest
against the drone software provider’s use of the images.
The surveillance conception of privacy, though, can also help explain some of the specific intent voyeurism statutes.326 Accordingly,
if someone captures an image from a public vantage point with voyeuristic intent, the occupant of the home may still have a privacy
interest in those images. The occupant did not knowingly share
those images with the voyeur. The drone software provider, therefore, should not have them in its possession. The occupant may be
able assert a privacy interest in those images enough to avoid the
application of the third-party doctrine.
Privacy protections supported by the reasonable expectations
theory of privacy create a more nuanced question under the thirdparty doctrine. The issue turns on how one defines the knowledge
standard within the third-party doctrine. What does it mean to
know that drone-captured images have been shared with a third
party?
From one perspective, knowledge might be established simply
by the occupant having reason to know that a drone could possibly
capture an image of some part of the home. By erecting barriers to
visual observation, even if those barriers do not prevent all observations from a public vantage point, the occupant demonstrates a
subjective privacy interest in preventing drone-captured images of
her home. But by the very erection of those barriers the occupant
signals that she knows that drone-image capture is possible. If she
knows drone image capture is possible and she does not prevent it
completely, then she has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the resulting images captured from a public vantage point.
This is the line of reasoning that the Court used in the manned
aircraft observations of homes in Ciraolo327 and Riley.328 Both defendants erected some barriers to visual observation, but not complete barriers. The Court held that neither had a reasonable expectation of privacy. If this line of linking is applied to drones,

326.
327.
328.

See supra section IV.C.2.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986).
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989).
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occupants must close their blinds and erect boxes impervious to
visual observation across their curtilages in order to have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This choice arises not because the
operational capabilities of drones, but because of this stringent
standard that establishes a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, an occupant would
not be able to assert enough of a privacy interest to prevent a drone
software provider from sharing images of the occupant’s home.
From another perspective, very specific information may be necessary to establish that an occupant knows that drone-image capture of her home is even possible. FAA rules for lawful drone operations require, among other things, that the operator keep the
drone within her visual line of sight329 and only operate over people
under certain circumstances.330 Additionally, some states and localities have laws that severely limit the possibility of lawful drone
operations in residential areas.331 These rules may effectively prevent people from operating drones in populated neighborhoods. In
fact, such rules have probably prevented the swarms of drones that
many predicted would occupy U.S. skies.332 Granted, many have
seen drones flying in public parks or at the beach, but lawful drone
operations in residential neighborhoods is probably much less commonplace. Accordingly, it may be premature to assert that drone
operations are ubiquitous.333 If drone operations in residential
329. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
331. See infra section VI.B.1.
332. E.g., Vacek, supra note 115, at 674; Farber, supra note 73, at 359; Schlag, supra
note 3, at 11–12, 18–20.
333. The question of whether drones are truly ubiquitous for the purpose of privacy jurisprudence is still an open one and merits further analysis. Until the Operations Over People regulation takes full effect, it is not clear that flights over populated areas would be
compliant with FAA regulations. See Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over
People, 88 Fed. Reg. 4314, 4314 (Jan. 15, 2021). Additionally, applying Justice Scalia’s reasoning of proving the negative from Florida v. Riley, privacy expectations might still exist
if drone flights over a populated area (e.g., someone’s home) “are unheard of.” Riley, 488
U.S. at 450–51. Applying the definition of privacy used in this Article, see supra Part I,
privacy expectations are highest in populated locations because people’s homes are in such
areas. Accordingly, if drones are not regularly flying above populated areas, then privacy
expectations from unwanted visual observations via drone might still exist. There is strong
evidence to suggest that drone operations are utterly absent from airspace above populated
areas generally and will remain out of such airspace for years to come. See Joshua S. Turner,
Katy J. Milner & Sara M. Baxenberg, FAA Adopts Final Rules for UAS Remote ID, Flights
over People, and at Night, WILEY (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.wiley.law/alert-FAA-AdoptsFinal-Rules-for-UAS-Remote-ID-Flights-over-People-and-at-Night [https://perma.cc/WK2
L-RHCA] (noting that the UAS Traffic Management system (“UTM”) is necessary for the
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neighborhoods are not ubiquitous, then it is reasonable for occupants to expect that their homes should be free from unwanted visual observations from drones. Absent direct evidence that a drone
is operating near her home, an occupant may understandably not
know that drones are capable of capturing images of her home.
If an occupant does not know that drones are operating nearby,
then her reasonable expectations of privacy may be established by
the erection of any barrier that prevents visual observation from
both the ground and manned aerial vehicles. She does not know
that drone-image capture is happening nearby. Her privacy inter-

widespread use of drones and the absence of a network-based requirement from the final
remote ID rule means that “UTM continues to be a long way off”); Simon Watkins, Jane
Rosemary Burry, Abdulghani Mohamed & Matthew Marion, Ten Questions Concerning the
Use of Drones in Urban Environments, 167 BUILDING & ENV’T 106458 (2020) (discussing the
challenges to realizing the widespread use of drones); Drones and Coronavirus: Do These
Applications Make Sense?, WE ROBOTICS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://blog.werobotics.org/2020/0
4/09/drones-coronavirus-no-sense/ [https://perma.cc/4N6N-HKHS] (discussing that even in
the emergent situation of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is difficult to deploy drones widely);
Chris Gillis, Metternet Readies Cargo Drone for FAA Tests, FREIGHT WAVES (May 13, 2020),
https://www.freightwaves.com/news/matternet-readies-cargo-drone-for-faa-tests [https://pe
rma.cc/8AAY-HXPW] (“However, industry experts say the agency’s durability and reliability testing to certify airworthiness is rigorous. ‘This will probably be measured in years rather than months, . . . . The strict safety requirements will require a lot of testing over a
relatively long period of time.’”); Brian Garrett-Glaser, Are Low-Altitude Weather Services
Ready for Drones and Air Taxis?, AVIATION TODAY (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.aviationtod
ay.com/2020/04/26/low-altitude-weather-services-ready-drones-air-taxis/ [https://perma.cc
/REA6-SLUR] (discussing how inadequate low-altitude weather information may limit the
widespread deployment of drones); Greg Nichols, The (Not-So-Secret Recipe) For a Commercial Drone Revolution, ZDNET (May 5, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/thesecret-recipe-for-a-commercial-drone-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/NXD5-2W3G] (arguing
that the lack of hardware and software standardization has prevented widespread drone
proliferation); Thomas Kirschstein, Comparison of Energy Demands of Drone-Based and
Ground-Based Parcel Delivery Services, 78 TRANSP. RES. PART D: TRANSP. & ENV’T 102209
(2020) (demonstrating that a widespread drone delivery system would consume more energy
than a land-based delivery system).
Even when headlines suggest that drones are making deliveries in populated areas
in certain communities, those flights appear to cover only a portion of the entire route,
relying on drivers for the other portions of the delivery. E.g., Rafael Sànchez, Indianapolis
Deli Makes Food Deliveries with a Drone, WRTV6 INDIANAPOLIS (Apr. 17, 2020, 9:09 AM),
https://www.theindychannel.com/open/indianapolis-deli-makes-food-deliveries-with-a-dron
e [https://perma.cc/TQG9-NJP3] (“Once the order is driven to a home or business, the drone
operator who is FAA licensed drops off the food from several feet away.”); UPS Flight Forward, CVS to Use Drones to Deliver Medicines to Florida Retirement Community, AUVSI
NEWS (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.auvsi.org/industry-news/ups-flight-forward-cvs-usedrones-deliver-medicines-florida-retirement-community
[https://perma.cc/R5EC-D5UL]
(“During the first flights, which are expected to be less than one half mile, deliveries will be
made to a location near the retirement community. To start, a ground vehicle will complete
the delivery to the resident’s door.”).
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est, therefore, is established even if the barriers do not prevent visual observation from all public vantage points accessible to drones.
This line of reasoning supports successful applications of the privacy torts. From this perspective, an occupant would not know
about the drone-captured images of her home held by the drone
software provider. Therefore, the third-party doctrine would not be
easily applied, and she could prevent the drone software provider’s
use and sharing of the images.
An interesting question arises when an occupant actually knows
that a neighbor owns and operates a drone. If the occupant does
not erect barriers to prevent the neighbor’s drone from making visual observations, it could be difficult for the occupant to assert that
she has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The secrecy conception
of privacy may help explain the occupant’s privacy interests in images capturing her in the bedroom or bathroom, and potentially
even images of her children playing in their treehouse.334 Her reasonable expectation of privacy exists in these places because of
their inherently private nature, even if the occupant does not erect
barriers to visual observations and knows a drone operates nearby.
The occupant may have enough of a privacy interest in such images
held by the drone software provider to prevent the application of
third-party doctrine.
An analysis of the occupant’s privacy interests in drone-captured
photos does not stop here. In an age of social media, someone who
posts pictures of an otherwise private space is arguably sharing
that space with the public. At least within the scope of that photo
(and maybe beyond), the occupant’s privacy interests in that space
are severely diminished.335 When an occupant uses a monitored
home security system that videos portions of the home not visible
to the public, the occupant has diminished her privacy interest in
exchange for (hopefully) an increased sense of security in the home.
That footage, though, is potentially subject to being shared with
third parties,336 or even warrantless disclosure to law enforcement
334. See supra section IV.C.4.
335. E.g., State v. Lambert, No. E2018-02296-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App.
LEXIS 303, at *31 (Apr. 28, 2020) (defense presenting social media postings as evidence of
alleged diminished expectations of privacy of victim); see Mathews, supra note 244, at 583
n.56.
336. See supra note 17; see, e.g., Privacy Notice, BLINK, https://blinkforhome.com/pages/p
rivacy-policy [https://perma.cc/4H8V-N9R8] (discussing how recordings might be shared
with third parties); ADT Security – Privacy Policy, ADT SECURITY, https://www.adt.com/abo
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agencies.337 Even if an occupant has a privacy interest in dronecaptured images of the home, the mere existence of images of the
same spaces in another’s possession may result in the application
of the third-party doctrine over the occupant’s objections.
Drone operators have the greatest ability to prevent the dissemination of drone-captured images. They must, however, take steps
to prevent the drone software provider from obtaining the images
in the first place. The drone operator must both not share the images with drone software provider and delete them from the operator’s own records.338 In Austria, recreational drone operators must
default to this software configuration absent regulatory authorization.339 If the drone-captured images exist in some location, there
is a strong likelihood that the third-party doctrine can apply to
them.
One more note on the third-party doctrine. Preventing application of the third-party doctrine in criminal cases involving dronecaptured images presents a paradox. If the occupant who is the
subject of the voyeurism has no other means to become aware of
the image capture, then the drone software provider may be in the
best position to inform law enforcement of the voyeurism. By the
drone software provider’s warrantless sharing of the images with
law enforcement, a successful prosecution of the voyeur is much
more likely. To advocate for an occupant’s privacy interests under
the voyeurism statute, the drone software provider must violate

ut-adt/legal/privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/H2MS-PXWU] (“Emergency Services: To provide our service(s), we will share your information with . . . third-party emergency service
providers such as police departments . . . .”); see also Alfred Ng, Ring Let Police View Map
of Video Doorbell Installations for over a Year, CNET (Dec. 3, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.c
net.com/news/ring-gave-police-a-street-level-view-of-where-video-doorbells-were-for-over-a
-year/ [https://perma.cc/5V9D-CEMM] (describing a program where police could potentially
identify Ring users to ask them to share videos).
337. See generally Kari Paul, Amazon Says ‘Black LivesMatter’. But the Company Has
Deep Ties to Policing, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2020/jun/09/amazon-black-lives-matter-police-ring-jeff-bezos [https://perma.cc/5
52D-KBD6] (describing several ways that Amazon shares information from or about people’s
homes with law enforcement).
338. See Vacek, supra note 7, at 139.
339. The Ultimate Guide to Austria (Vienna) Drone Laws & Rules, DRONE MADE (Dec.
11, 2018), https://www.drone-made.com/post/austria-drone-laws [https://perma.cc/6Y3S-T8
79] (“Important, you’re not allowed to film, take photos for leisure or commercial use without
an appropriate authorisation delivered by Austro Control. Live broadcast is also forbidden.”).
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the very privacy interests that would prevent the application of the
third-party doctrine.
For all these reasons, the flow of drone data interacts with the
third-party doctrine to further demonstrate that privacy jurisprudence forces occupants to make difficult decisions between enjoying use of their property and enjoying protections from unwanted
visual observations of the home.
V. THE PRIVACY IMPACT UNIQUE TO DRONES
Drones are distinct from manned aircraft because of their combination of minimum safe altitude of lawful operations, maneuverability, required training, operator intent, and detectability.340
With this combination of features, drones can lawfully operate in
spaces that allow for image capture distinct from the capabilities
of observers on the ground, manned aerial photography, satellites,
and even a neighbor’s elevated vantage points.341 When considering the privacy protections enjoyed in and around the home, drones
are the only technology that may be able to make visual observations of spaces in the dwelling not otherwise visible to the public
without trespassing.342 Even in spaces in the dwelling and curtilage that are possibly visible to the public, drones challenge the
privacy expectations of occupants in a manner distinct from any
other visual observation method or technology because no temporary or incomplete physical barrier will effectively prevent unwanted visual observations.343 In the instance of children in treehouses, drones offer the possibility of image capture inaccessible to
other vantage points and technologies. This, combined with the difficulties of erecting physical barriers to unwanted visual observations, means that drones may uniquely impact the privacy of children in treehouses.344 Once an image of one of these spaces has
been captured, the drone operating software typically shares it
with the drone software provider. The distribution of this image
may trigger the third-party doctrine further challenging one’s privacy interests in and around the home.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

See supra section III.A.
See supra section III.B.
See supra section IV.B.1.
See supra section III.B.
See supra section IV.B.4.
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Considering the full scope of all possible visual observations of
the home, the privacy impact of drones is quite limited. Depending
on a specific home’s barriers to visual observation and the location
of neighbor’s fixed vantage points, drones may not have a unique
privacy impact at all. The occupant already enjoys no freedom from
visual observation in a fence-less yard or in spaces visible from
manned aircraft operating at altitudes of at least 400 feet. For
those spaces visible to a neighbor, it is not clear that a drone impacts privacy any more than the neighbor’s fixed vantage points
do.
Even in those spaces that are possibly visible to the public, government actors can already make warrantless observations. Occupants only have limited protections from unwanted visual observations by private actors in these spaces. If the observer has the
requisite intent to violate a voyeurism statute, trigger a privacy
tort, or create a private nuisance, then drones do little to challenge
the protections from unwanted visual observations. Without the
requisite intent, it is not clear that the lawful operation of a drone
impacts an occupant’s privacy in places possibly visible to the public.
Once an image exists, the third-party doctrine turns on the question of whether it has been knowingly shared with others. Aside
from aerial photography, other image capture platforms distribute
images similarly to how drone operating software programs do.
NASA shares updated images captured from the Landsat 8 satellite on a regular basis. Cellular phones often run backup programs
that share images captured on the phone with third-party software
providers.345 Under each of these circumstances the third-party
doctrine may apply. Drone-captured images, therefore, are not necessarily unique in how the third-party doctrine might apply to
them.
Absent an occupant’s extreme efforts to prevent public views of
her home, drones impact privacy no differently than other means
of image capture. The unique privacy impact of drones, therefore,
345. See Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the
Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247, 295 (2016); Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle
Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 1045–46
(2016); Cristina Del Rosso & Carol M. Bast, Protecting Online Privacy in the Digital Age:
Carpenter v. United States and the Fourth Amendment’s Third-Party Doctrine, 28 CATH. U.
J.L. & TECH. 89, 91–92 (2020).
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takes a peculiar shape. The current privacy jurisprudence requires
that an occupant erect physical barriers in and around the home
to prevent all other unwanted visual observations. As discussed,
this presents a very difficult choice between enjoying her property
and erecting structures that prevent all unwanted visual observations.
If an occupant goes to these lengths, then lawful drone operations can have a unique impact on privacy. Compounding this impact, drone-captured images often become the business records of
drone software providers, allowing for the application of the thirdparty doctrine. Drones did not create these legal circumstances,
but simply serve to stretch the reasoning behind the jurisprudence
to its logical extreme. Legislative efforts to address the privacy impact of drones must aim either to address the unique privacy impact of drones, or to change privacy doctrines. Otherwise, the legislation does little to affect the privacy impact of drones.
VI. AN ANALYSIS OF STATE AND LOCAL STATUTES THAT SEEK TO
ADDRESS DRONE PRIVACY ISSUES
As discussed, federal authorities have not enacted drone-specific
laws focused on privacy in the home.346 This analysis, therefore,
examines drone-specific state and local laws that impact a drone
operator’s ability to make visual observations of another’s home.
These laws fall into five distinct groupings, each limiting (1) where
drones can operate, (2) under what conditions drones can capture
images, (3) what images drone operators can capture, (4) drone operations by certain classes of people, and (5) the flow and uses of
drone data. The Appendix contains the complete list of laws analyzed by this Article. Though there are many variations in the elements of these laws, a necessary element of each is a common actus
reus—the otherwise lawful operation of a drone for the purpose of
image capture.347 Before determining whether each of these categories of drone-specific laws actually has the potential to addresses
the unique privacy impacts of drones, it is important to outline the
assumptions upon which this analysis proceeds.
346. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg.
42,064, 42,190 (June 28, 2016); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FAA, 821 F.3d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
347. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/26/2021 3:42 PM

DRONES AND DATA

1055

A. Assumptions
This analysis of drone-specific state and local laws is based on
three hotly debated assumptions. First, the drone-specific state
and local laws are not preempted by federal law and FAA regulations. Second, aside from the preemption question, each of these
laws is constitutional on all other grounds, namely under the First
Amendment. Third, in the application of these laws, the drone operator can be readily identified. Without these assumptions, it becomes very challenging to determine whether the drone-specific
privacy laws have the potential to address the unique privacy issues presented by drones.
Regarding preemption, there are some indications that this
question is settled. The FAA, in numerous public statements348 and
in its notice of rulemaking for drone regulations, has taken the position that drone-specific privacy issues are the purview of states
and localities.349 The FAA simply focuses its rules on the safety of
drone flight operations.350 When challenged in court to promulgate
drone-specific privacy regulations, the FAA has been sided with by
the courts.351 It is not clear, though, that all state and local dronespecific privacy laws could completely avoid preemption by the
FAA.352
Certain state and local laws which aim to protect privacy, such
as certain trespassing statutes, may encroach on the FAA’s drone
flight operations remit.353 The FAA has the authority to regulate
the safety of flight operations from the ground up.354 Aerial trespass, though, occurs when someone encroaches on immediate

348. E.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, STATE AND LOCAL
REGULATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET 3 (2015); NAT’L
TELECOM. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 163, at 1.
349. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at
42,192.
350. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 348, at 1.
351. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FAA, 821 F.3d 39, 44–45 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
352. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DRONE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (DAC)—TASK GROUP (TG)
1 RECOMMENDED TASKING ON ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2–3 (2017); Ron Fonger, Injunction Opens Park Airspace to Drones in Michigan County, GOV’T TECH. (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.govtech.com/products/Injunction-Opens-Park-Airspace-to-Drones-in-Michigan
-County.html [https://perma.cc/6W9P-VYY5].
353. E.g., Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D. Mass. 2017).
354. Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft–Update, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN. (Jul. 18, 2016), http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76381 [https://perma.cc/
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reaches of the atmosphere adjoining the land such as to interfere
with the occupant’s enjoyment of the land.355 When only manned
aircraft ruled the skies, a combination of legal precedents strongly
suggested that an aircraft operating in public airspace did not commit aerial trespass.356 This broad rule has been tempered by the
acquisition of avigation easements from property owners in the
take-off and landing paths around airports and other aerodromes.357 With the introduction of drones, the question of where
airspace subject to aerial trespass ends and the public airways
begin has become much more complex.358 See Troy Rule’s article,
Airspace in an Age of Drones, for an excellent analysis of this question.359 To avoid resolving the question of FAA preemption regarding aerial trespass, this analysis assumes that aerial trespass
starts across the terrestrial property line at any altitude, unless
the specific law says otherwise.
On the constitutionality front, the question of whether dronespecific privacy laws violate the First Amendment remains open.
Several jurisdictions have enacted drone-specific privacy laws that
may effectively ban image capture by drones under certain circumstances.360 Courts have recognized the right to record images as a
necessary precursor to speech.361 Accordingly, restrictions on recordings made by drones may impinge speech rights protected by
the First Amendment. Regarding freedom from visual observation
in the home, these statutes may be considered overbroad.362 Drone
image capture prohibitions directed at places other than the
home—commercial facilities, public gatherings, etc.—are already

BN92-A4H3] (“Myth #3: The FAA doesn’t control airspace below 400 feet . . . Fact—The FAA
is responsible for air safety from the ground up.”).
355. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also Rule, supra
note 239, at 156.
356. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946); Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84
F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936); Reaver v. Martin Theaters, 52 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1951).
357. See supra note 295.
358. See Matt Reynolds, ABA House of Delegates Passes Resolution on Drones; Delegate
Calls It ‘A Hot Topic,’ ABA J. (Feb. 17, 2020), https://abajournal.com/news/article/resolution111 [https://perma.cc/7C33-53XP].
359. See generally Rule, supra note 239.
360. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002.
361. See Blitz et al., supra note 24, at 87–91; Kaminski, supra note 3, at 61 n.24.
362. Kaminski, supra note 3, at 61–64; Matiteyahu, supra note 4, at 283.
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being challenged on First Amendment grounds.363 But, for the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that none of these state and
local drone-specific laws aimed at protecting the privacy of the
home are unconstitutional.364
The last assumption necessary for this analysis is that the occupant of the home can readily identify the drone operator. As discussed above, this is a most challenging assumption related to
drones.365 When all parties conduct themselves lawfully, it is very
difficult to identify who is operating a drone.366 Adding to these
challenges that someone operating a drone with a privacy-invading
intent may take precautions against being identified, it may be effectively impossible to identify a drone operator.367 Without this
assumption, adjudication of any of the drone-specific privacy protections becomes incredibly challenging. The question of the efficacy of these laws in protecting against drone-specific privacy invasions would, therefore, necessarily have to address identifying
the drone operator. Assuming that the drone operator can be identified, though, this analysis can focus on whether it is even possible
for the drone-specific law to protect against the unique privacy impacts of drones.
B. Analysis of State and Local Laws
1. Laws That Limit Where Drones Can Operate
States and localities have adopted a variety of provisions that
limit where drones can operate. At one extreme, Augusta, Georgia
has banned nearly all drone operations without written permission
from the Augusta city commission.368 The New Jersey boroughs of
Allendale and Beachwood have bans on drone operations “below

363. See Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n v. McCraw, No. 1:19-cv-946-RP, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 222642 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2020).
364. But see BENNETT, supra note 42, at 5.
365. See supra notes 162–73 and accompanying text.
366. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-20-29, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS:
FAA’S COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT APPROACH FOR DRONES COULD BENEFIT FROM
IMPROVED COMMUNICATION AND DATA 15, 17 (2019).
367. See supra section IV.B.5.
368. AUGUSTA, GA., MUN. CODE § 1-3-44 (allowing one exception—drone operations over
previously designated model aircraft airfields).
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400 feet over residential . . . zone[s].”369 These laws address the
unique privacy issues presented by drones by effectively preventing drones from operating in areas where they could capture images of homes. If drones cannot operate, they cannot capture images that impact privacy in and about the home.
Many municipalities370 have enacted laws that designate any
unwanted encroachment by drone at any altitude across a terrestrial property line as trespass.371 Laws such as these may not prevent unwanted visual observations by drone.372 A drone need not
cross terrestrial property lines to capture images of another’s
home.373 The specific arrangement of visual barriers at a particular
home, therefore, will determine whether laws such as these actually protect against the unique privacy impact of drones. Some
states and municipalities have determined that trespass by drone
takes place only when the drone both encroaches across the terrestrial property line and operates below a certain altitude. West Goshen, Pennsylvania, for example, has designated that altitude at
200 feet.374 In Tennessee and Wyoming, the statutes do not designate a specific altitude, but set conditions under which low flying
drones would be committing trespass.375 Like with provisions that
designate trespass at any altitude, the efficacy of these laws in addressing the unique privacy impact of drones depends entirely on
the visual barriers an occupant has erected around her home.
In other words, the efficacy of these laws hinges on the presence
of visual barriers necessitated by current privacy jurisprudence.
Drones did not create these circumstances. Rather, current U.S.
369. ALLENDALE, N.J., MUN. CODE §§ 118-2, -3; Beachwood, N.J., Ordinance 2016–04
(Mar. 16, 2016). If challenged, these laws would likely be preempted. See Singer v. City of
Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d 125, 131–32 (2017) (holding that a similar limitation on drone
operations was preempted by FAA regulations).
370. E.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 10-36-400(b)(12); TELLURIDE, COLO., MUN. CODE § 1011-30(g); LAUREL HOLLOW, N.Y., CODE § 85-9(C).
371. FRANKLIN LAKES, N.J., CODE § 137-3(A) (“Small unmanned aircraft shall not operate in any airspace below 400 feet within the Borough: (1) Over private property, without
the permission of the private property owner . . . .”).
372. In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis noted in his dissent it was “immaterial where the
physical connection with the telephone wires . . . was made.” Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). By analogy to drones, it does not matter if
the drone is trespassing when it makes unwanted visual observations of someone’s home.
See also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 421–22 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring).
373. See supra section IV.B.
374. WEST GOSHEN, PA., CODE § 51A-2(A).
375. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-405(d); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-303(a)(i).
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privacy protections present those seeking relief from unwanted visual observations by drones with a nearly impossible choice.
At the other extreme of laws dictating where drones can operate,
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia have made trespass by drone
illegal only after the occupant has provided the drone operator notice that such encroachment is unwanted.376 These laws do little to
prevent unwanted visual observations by drones for two reasons.
First, as with laws that define trespass at the terrestrial property
lines, the efficacy of such laws depends on the particular physical
barriers that an occupant has erected around her home.377 Second,
even if the occupant sees the drone on its first flight over the occupant’s home, that flight is not unlawful under these statutes. The
drone operator can keep making unwanted visual observations of
the occupant’s home until the occupant specifically tells the drone
operator to stop.378 When considering the property theory and surveillance conception of privacy, even the possibility of a single lawful image capture means that these laws effectively offer no protection from unwanted visual observations.379 These laws only offer
some protection from unwanted visual observations under the reasonable expectations theory and secrecy conception of privacy because the occupant expresses her desired level of privacy by asking
the drone operator to stop.380
2. Laws That Limit Under What Conditions Drones Can
Capture Images
Another group of laws prohibits using a drone to capture images
without the consent of the subject of the image capture. States like
Idaho, Tennessee, and Texas require permission to capture images
of an occupant’s home.381 Chicopee, Massachusetts requires consent for drone image capture of any person, regardless of whether

376. NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103; OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380(1)(a)–(b); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-6-206(2)(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-121.3.
377. See supra notes 372–374 and accompanying text.
378. When considering the difficulty in both detecting a drone and identifying a drone
operator, these statutes’ ability to protect privacy becomes even more limited. See supra
section III.A.5.
379. See supra sections IV.C.1, IV.C.2.
380. See supra sections IV.C.3, IV.C.4.
381. IDAHO CODE § 21-213(2)(a)(i); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-902(a)(7); TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 423.002(a)(6).
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they are in their home.382 These laws acknowledge that drones are
primarily data collection devices and that operators have to
demonstrate very little intent in order to make visual observations
of others.383 By creating a presumption that image capture is not
permitted, these laws require the drone operator to first notify occupants of the intended image capture. The burden of preventing
unwanted visual observation falls on the drone operator, not the
occupant of the home having to erect barriers that deprive her of
enjoyment of her property. At that point an occupant knows that
drone image capture may take place and can decide whether to
grant permission to the drone operator. If these laws work as intended, they have the potential to be very effective in preventing
unwanted visual observations via drone of occupants in and about
their homes.
3. Laws That Limit What Images Drone Operators Can Capture
The next group of laws limits what images drone operators can
capture. For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the
occupant has not provided her consent for the image capture.384
Some of these laws focus on the content of the images. Wisconsin
and Hermosa Beach, California ban the use of drones to capture
any image of a space where the occupant has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”385 It is not clear that such provisions actually
prevent unwanted visual observations from drones. The question
of the occupant’s reasonable expectation of privacy depends on both
the visual barriers she has erected around her home and which line
of reasoning the court will apply to determine reasonable expectations of privacy.386 If a court uses the line of reasoning found in
Ciraolo and Riley, the failure to erect a complete visual barrier
means that the occupant has no reasonable expectation of privacy.387 Provisions like these, therefore, arguably do little to address the unique privacy impact of drones.

382. CHICOPEE, MASS., CODE § 186-4(C)(7).
383. See supra section III.A.4.
384. For this group of laws, the occupant’s lack of consent, either explicit or implied by
virtue of the subject matter of the image, tends to be a necessary element for a successful
cause of action. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(3)(b); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3505(a)(1).
385. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 942.10; HERMOSA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.38.040(H).
386. See supra sections IV.C, IV.D.
387. See supra notes 323–25 and accompanying text.
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The West Virginia statute, for example, addresses this issue by
specifying that an invasion of privacy happens when a drone operator captures or records an image “through a window.”388 Burbank,
California takes a similar approach because images cannot be captured of “an enclosed area from public view such as fenced backyards or the interior of any structure.”389 Provisions like these help
address the unique privacy issues presented by drones because
they attempt to prevent image capture of spaces accessible to visual observation by drones, even if the occupant has not erected
complete visual barriers.
The largest number of drone-specific laws that affect unwanted
visual observations of the home focus on the drone operator’s intent. The content of drone-captured images violate these laws because the drone operator captured them with the intent to commit
surveillance,390 stalking,391 harassment,392 voyeurism,393 or invasion of privacy.394 By focusing on the drone operator’s intent these
laws place less emphasis on the visual barriers erected by occupants around their homes. Drone operators with improper intents
cannot take advantage of drones’ unique abilities to capture images from vantage points inaccessible by other means or technologies. Like their non-drone-specific counterparts, it is difficult to enforce these laws because the act of merely operating the drone and
(nearly automatically)395 capturing images with it may not be
enough to establish the drone operator’s illegal intent.396 In short,
if intent can be established by other means then these laws take
an important step to address the unique privacy issues presented
by drones.

388. W. VA. CODE § 61-16-2(1).
389. BURBANK, CAL., CODE § 5-3-1602(M) (using these examples, presumably “public
view” means ground-level observations only).
390. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.4-05(2)(a); CUYAHOGA HEIGHTS, OHIO, CODE §
650(.02)(b).
391. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40-28(g); HERMOSA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE §
9.38.040(M).
392. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1334(b)(4); Defuniak Springs, Fla., Ordinance 866 §
3.E.3 (May 23, 2016).
393. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-102(b); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61(1)(b).
394. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8; Ada County, Idaho, Ordinance 883 § 3 (May 15, 2018).
395. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; Miller, supra note 1, at 353.
396. See Scharf, supra note 23, at 1101; Friedenzohn & Branum, supra note 3, at 401 (“It
would be difficult for a party to argue that the use and enjoyment of their property is affected
by a UAS flying somewhere near their property.”); see also supra section III.A.4.
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4. Laws That Limit Drone Operations by Certain Classes of
People
A smaller group of laws specifically restricts image capture by
drone based on the classification of the drone operator. In several
states, individuals who are subject to judicial protective orders,
like restraining orders, may not use drones to capture images in
violation of such orders.397 For the individuals these judicial orders
seek to protect, these statutes help address the unique privacy issues presented by drones. By specifically listing drone use as a
means of violating these orders, the individuals protected by these
orders do not have to block all possible visual observations by
drones in order to protect their own privacy interests against invasions by specific individuals.398
If an individual is a registered sex offender in Indiana, Michigan,
or Virginia, that person’s ability to use a drone may be significantly
proscribed.399 If such an individual seeks to capture images of occupants in a home it may violate one of these statutes. The occupant’s efforts to block visual observations do not factor into these
laws. Accordingly, such laws can help address the unique privacy
issues presented by drones.
In Texas a real estate broker or land surveyor can only capture
images via drone if it is within the scope of her professional practice and no individuals can be identified in the images.400 Capturing images of homes is an important activity in both these professions. Even though an occupant’s property appears in the field of
view of a drone-captured image, at least no images of the occupant
herself can be used by the real estate broker or surveyor. These
provisions, therefore, have some effect on the unique privacy issues
presented by drones.

397. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1334(b)(6); IND. CODE § 35-46-1-15.1(a)–(b); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 259.322(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40-28(f).
398. It is worth noting, though, that the detectability issues presented by drones may
make enforcement of these statutes more challenging. See supra section III.A.5.
399. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12.5(b); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 259.322(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2324.2(A).
400. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002(13)(19).
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5. Laws That Limit the Flow and Uses of Drone Data
Some jurisdictions, recognizing the inherent data-collection
qualities of drones, have enacted legislation specifically aimed at
limiting how data might flow from a drone. In Idaho and Laurel
Hollow, New York, for example, a drone operator cannot publish or
otherwise publicly disseminate a drone-captured image of an individual without her consent.401 It is important to examine these provisions in light of the fact that drone software providers often have
automatic access to drone-captured images.402 This feature of
drones means that the drone-captured image may instantly be
transmitted from the operator’s drone or phone to computer facilities under the drone software provider’s control.403 The drone software provider may share the images on a public forum404 or sell
the images.405
Accordingly, the act of capturing an image via drone is tantamount to disclosing, displaying, distributing, or otherwise using
that image.406 If a jurisdiction has this understanding of drone data
flows, then this law effectively prevents image capture without the
occupant’s permission.407 Occupants do not have to erect visual
barriers around their homes to enjoy a privacy interest in a dronecaptured image. Rather, the drone operator simply has a duty not
to share the images. Hence, the third-party doctrine has limited
effects. In that way, this provision helps address the unique privacy issues presented by drones.
Even if a jurisdiction views drone image capture and drone image publishing as separate acts, the requirement to obtain the occupant’s permission to distribute the images has some effect on the
unique privacy issues presented by drones. Because of the permission requirement, the occupant has some agency in how images of

401. IDAHO CODE § 21-213(2)(b); LAUREL HOLLOW, N.Y., CODE § 85-9(B).
402. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
403. See BARSTOW, CAL., CODE § 9.66.020(d) (banning transmission of drone-captured
images); MANHATTAN BEACH, CAL., CODE § 3.70.030(A) (banning transmission of drone-captured images).
404. DJI Privacy Policy, supra note 17 (discussing the SkyPixel image sharing forum).
405. See supra note 322.
406. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-904(a)(2)(B); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.004(a)(2).
407. See Scharf, supra note 23, at 1102–03.
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herself or her home are distributed, particularly under a reasonable expectations theory or secrecy conception of privacy.408 This effectively provides some privacy protection independent of what visual barriers she may have erected around her home.
Focusing more directly on the third-party doctrine, some states
have passed laws that limit law enforcement’s ability to use dronecaptured images.409 These laws often prevent law enforcement
from obtaining drone-captured images, even from private drone operators, except pursuant to a warrant.410 Some states allow for the
full range of exceptions to the warrant requirement,411 while others
offer just a few exceptions412 and others directly limit the admissibility of drone-captured images from private operators.413
These statutes have some effect on the unique privacy issues created by drones. Even if a drone-captured image of the occupant’s
home exists, each of these provisions presents a barrier to government access to the photo without a warrant. Rather than simply
being able to subpoena drone-captured images held by third parties, the government actor must consider whether a warrant is required. That analysis leads to a review of any applicable warrant
exceptions. If the content of the images includes parts of the home
considered in “plain view,” then a warrant requirement is ineffectual because current privacy jurisprudence dictates any part of the
home is in “plain view” unless it is behind a complete visual barrier.414 Accordingly, the existence of the photo may be enough
grounds for finding a warrant exception, thereby leaving the
unique privacy issues presented by drones effectively unaddressed.
Only statutes that limit government access or use of drone-captured images and limit the warrant exceptions can have an effect
on unique privacy issues presented by drones.

408. See supra sections IV.C.3, IV.C.4.
409. Kaminski, supra note 3, at 66; infra note 410.
410. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 934.50(4)(b); WIS. STAT. § 175.55(2).
411. E.g., IOWA CODE § 808.15; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-109(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2929.4-02.
412. E.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/40; OR. REV. STAT. § 837.320.
413. E.g., IND. CODE § 35-33-5-10; NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.112(4).
414. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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C. Third-Party Doctrine Revisited
Laws on government use of drone-captured images are not the
only statutes that may affect the application of the third-party doctrine. All the state and local laws discussed in this Part VI help
define an occupant’s privacy interests in the drone-captured images. Taking all the drone-specific state and local laws into account, the occupant has the strongest privacy interest in images of
the home when the following eight factors are present:
(1) the drone operator has limited authorization, based on her
status (profession or judicial orders), to capture images of the home
in question;415
(2) the occupant has blocked public observation of the space in
question from visual observations made from the ground, the air,
and the neighbors’ fixed vantage points;416
(3) the occupant has not granted the drone operator permission
to capture the images;417
(4) the occupant lives in a jurisdiction that requires specific authorization to share data gathered by drones;418
(5) the drone operator captures the images with a privacy-invading intent;419
(6) the occupant has not previously shared (either herself or
through prior authorization to another) images of the space in
question;420
(7) the jurisdiction in question has a warrant requirement for
use of drone-obtained data (including images);421 and
(8) no warrant exceptions apply to the facts and circumstances
in question.422

415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

See supra section VI.B.4.
See supra Part V.
See supra section VI.B.2.
See supra section VI.B.5.
See supra section VI.B.3.
See supra section IV.D.
See supra section VI.B.5.
See supra section VI.B.5.
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This list proceeds roughly along the timeline of drone data flows
to identify the points where laws and other legal doctrines may be
asserted to protect the occupant’s privacy interests. Starting with
rules affecting the drone operator, if the drone operator is not permitted to capture images of the home in question, then the occupant’s privacy interests can be protected independent of any steps
the occupant may have taken or failed to take. If the operator is
permitted to fly the drone, the next question revolves around the
physical layout of the occupant’s home. Consistent with current jurisprudence, the occupant would have a difficult time asserting a
privacy interest in observations made from a public vantage point.
Even if the drone operator had a privacy invading intent, it would
be difficult to find evidence of that intent from such images because
the occupant did not erect adequate barriers to prevent visual observations from public vantage points. If the occupant clears this
(rather high) hurdle, in some jurisdictions the privacy protection
burden moves back to the drone operator because the occupant has
to authorize the capture of images of her home. The privacy-invading nature of the drone observation, though, may be impacted by
whether the occupant shared images of her home at another time.
Accordingly, it may be difficult for an occupant to assert a privacy
interest in images that she has already shared. If the occupant still
has a privacy interest in drone-captured images after all these circumstances have been considered, then government actors may
need a warrant to obtain the drone-captured images in question.
At this point, warrant exceptions or restrictions on images captured from drones come into play relative to the occupant’s privacy
interest.
In short, aside from the first factor, if any of the other factors are
absent, then the occupant’s privacy interest in the images captured
by a drone is diminished and the third-party doctrine may be applied. With each diminishment in privacy interests, law enforcement’s warrant requirement to access the images captured by the
drone also diminishes. Figure 3 presents a decision tree that outlines the three possible outcomes relative to drone-captured images and the third-party doctrine.
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Figure 3—Drone-Captured Images and the Third-Party Doctrine
Decision Tree
QUESTION

YES

NO

#1: Is the person operating the drone someone with
limited legal right to capture images of the home or
occupant in question?

Proceed to #2

Proceed to #3

#2: Does the local law allow the person with limited
legal rights to obtain permission to use the drone to
capture images of the home or occupant in question?

Proceed to #4

Proceed to #8—occupant’s privacy interest
is strong

#3: Has the occupant asserted a privacy interest in
those portions of the home subject to image capture
by blocking them from all public ground-level observations, all aerial observations, and each of the
neighbors’ fixed vantage points?

Proceed to #4

Proceed to #9—occupant’s privacy interest
is diminished

#4: Was the image captured with the occupant’s permission?

Proceed to #5

If arriving from #3,
proceed to #6; if arriving from #2, proceed to
#8—occupant’s privacy
interest is strong

#5: Did the permission include the authorization to
share the images or other drone data?

Proceed to #9—occupant’s
privacy interest is diminished

Proceed to #7

#6: Was the image captured with a privacy-invading
interest?

Proceed to #8—occupant’s
privacy interest is strong

Proceed to #7

#7: Does the law in that jurisdiction require occupant
authorization to share drone data?

Proceed to #8—occupant’s
privacy interest is strong

Proceed to #9—occupant’s privacy interest
is diminished

#8: Has the occupant previously shared (published or
authorized another to capture) images of the private
space in question?

Proceed to #9—occupant’s
privacy interest is diminished

Option A

#9: Does the jurisdiction have any warrant requirements for law enforcement use of drone data?

Proceed to #10

Option B

#10: Do any warrant exceptions, based on the law or
the facts and circumstances, apply to this image?

Option B

Option C

Option A: Third-Party Doctrine Unlikely to Apply
The occupant has a strong privacy interest in the images. Therefore, barring other circumstances, law enforcement likely needs a warrant to obtain the images.
Option B: Third-Party Doctrine Likely to Apply
The occupant has a diminished privacy interest in the images. Therefore, it is unlikely that law enforcement
would need a warrant to obtain the images.
Option C: Third-Party Doctrine Could Possibly Apply
The occupant has a diminished privacy interest in the images, but some other factor may require that law enforcement obtain a warrant to obtain the images. Therefore, the particular circumstances will dictate whether
the third-party doctrine applies.
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As one can see from Figure 3, there are few circumstances under
which an occupant will have a strong privacy interest in dronecaptured images. The biggest obstacle for avoiding application of
the third-party doctrine arises at Question 3—erecting all the necessary visual barriers to prevent unwanted visual observations. As
discussed throughout this Article, drones did not create this requirement. Rather the existing privacy jurisprudence effectively
forces people seeking freedom from unwanted visual observations
to keep their blinds closed and make their curtilage an indoor
space. If someone does not meet this requirement, only limitations
to warrant exceptions could prevent the full application of thirdparty doctrine.
If someone has erected all the necessary physical barriers, then
state and local legislative efforts help preserve those privacy interests. The analysis reveals that there are still many opportunities
to diminish one’s privacy interests. In other words, unless all the
correct conditions align there is at least a chance that the thirdparty doctrine could be applied. In principle, the combination of all
these laws has some impact on the unique privacy issues presented
by the lifecycle of drone-captured data. To the best of the author’s
knowledge no single state has all these laws in place.423 The application of all these privacy protections as presented here, therefore,
is merely theoretical. Until a state enacts the full complement of
these laws, occupants will effectively have no privacy interests in
drone-captured data that can survive application of the third-party
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This Article sought to demonstrate that the privacy impact of
drones is really very limited. Starting with a precise definition of
drones, drones were distinguished from manned aircraft, other image capture technologies, and even a neighbor’s elevated vantage
points. When moving through the spaces of the home that enjoy
different levels of privacy protection, the unique privacy impact of
drones becomes clear—drones impact privacy uniquely when they
make visual observations not accessible to other technologies and

423. There may be some local jurisdictions that have all these provisions in place, particularly in Tennessee or California. The author has not conducted the exhaustive research
required to find these specific localities.
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methods. Relatively few factual circumstances create this possibility. Accordingly, drones have a limited impact on privacy.
The current U.S. privacy jurisprudence requires that an occupant make both her dwelling and her curtilage impervious to visual observations. Drones did not create these conditions. Rather,
drones highlight the logical conclusion that one must draw from
the application of existing privacy doctrines.
Drones are primarily information gathering devices, so the flow
of data from drones was important to this Article. Absent complete
barriers to visual observation and the happenstance of living in a
jurisdiction with strong drone-specific privacy protections, the
third-party doctrine likely applies to most drone-captured images.
Accordingly, people who are the subject of drone-captured images
have almost no recourse to prevent the sharing of those images
with the government or other parties.
Considering these legal and factual realities, efforts to address
the privacy issues raised by drones can proceed on two fronts. Legislation can limit drones’ ability to capture data. Other countries
have taken this approach. In the U.S. though, First Amendment
concerns would likely limit the applicability of such laws to drone
image capture of the visible light spectrum. Legislation that limits
drones’ ability to capture other parts of the electromagnetic spectrum (e.g., infrared, ultraviolet, radio frequencies), audio frequencies, or chemical sensing would likely have fewer First Amendment
issues.
If legislation cannot effectively limit drones’ ability to capture
images of the visual light spectrum, then the only other way to address the privacy impact of drones is to change privacy doctrine.
Drones highlight the fact that privacy jurisprudence requires the
occupant of a home to erect complete physical barriers to prevent
unwanted visual observations. The third-party doctrine only exacerbates the effects of this requirement. Both the privacy jurisprudence and the third-party doctrine arose from cases that did not
involve drones, but those cases discussed the very issues highlighted by drones. Accordingly, it is not fair to say that drones are
impacting privacy in a unique way when the cases that form the
basis of U.S. privacy protections contemplated the present circumstances. A combination of changes to the privacy doctrine and the
third-party doctrine could strike a better balance between lawful
drone operations and the privacy protections afforded to people in
the United States.
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APPENDIX
DRONE-SPECIFIC STATE AND LOCAL LAWS IMPACTING
PRIVACY OF THE HOME
Laws That Limit Where Drones Can Operate
PARADISE VALLEY, ARIZ., TOWN CODE §§ 10-12-1 et seq.
BARSTOW, CAL., CODE § 9.60
BURBANK, CAL., CODE § 5-3-16-02
HERMOSA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.38.010 et seq.
LOS ALAMITOS, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 8.52.010 et seq.
WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., CODE § 9.30.040
CHERRY HILLS VILLAGE, COLO., CODE § 5-3-16-02
TELLURIDE, COLO., MUN. CODE §§ 10.11.10 et seq.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1334
Defuniak Springs, Fla., Ordinance 866 (May 23, 2016)
AUGUSTA, GA., MUN. CODE §§ 1-3-44 et seq.
WARNER ROBINS, GA., CODE §§ 13-102, -103
CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 10-36-400
ROLLING MEADOWS, ILL., CODE § 38-355
PRAIRIE VILLAGE, KAN., CODE §§ 11-1601 et seq.
CHICOPEE, MASS., CODE § 186-4
HOLYOKE, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 54-22
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 259.320
CITY OF EAST LANSING, MICH., CODE § 26-67
SAINT BONIFACIUS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 91-01 et seq.
CITY OF WILDWOOD, MO., CODE § 236.010
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 493.103, .109
ALLENDALE, N.J., MUN. CODE §§ 118-2, -3
Beachwood, N.J., Ordinance 2016-04 (Mar. 16, 2016)
FRANKLIN LAKES, N.J., CODE §§ 137-1 et seq.
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LONG BEACH, N.J., CODE §§ 57-2, -3
OCEAN, N.J., CODE §§ 153-2, -3
HUNTINGTON, N.Y., CODE § 189
LAUREL HOLLOW, N.Y., CODE § 85-9
N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE §§ 10-126 et seq.
NORTHPORT, N.Y., CODE § 313
ROCKLAND COUNTY, N.Y., CODE § 234
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-300.2
BOTTINEAU, N.D., CODE § 10.0902
NICHOLS HILLS, OKLA., CODE § 32-188
OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380
WEST GOSHEN, PA., CODE § 51A-2
WILLISTOWN, PA., CODE § 128
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-1
ABERDEEN, S.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10-2
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-121.3
GREENFIELD, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10.35
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-303

Laws That Limit Under What Conditions Drones Can Capture Images
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-101(b)
Defuniak Springs, Fla., Ordinance 866 (May 23, 2016)
IDAHO CODE § 21-213
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:63
CITY OF CHICOPEE, MASS., CODE § 186-4
HOLYOKE, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 54-22
ALLENDALE, N.J., MUN. CODE §§ 118-2, -3
Beachwood, N.J., Ordinance 2016-04 (Mar. 16, 2016)
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FRANKLIN LAKES, N.J., CODE §§ 137-1 et seq.
LONG BEACH, N.J., CODE §§ 57-2, -3
OCEAN, N.J., CODE §§ 155-2, -3
HUNTINGTON, N.Y., CODE § 189
LAUREL HOLLOW, N.Y., CODE § 85-9
NORTHPORT, N.Y., CODE § 313
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-300.1
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.4-05
CUYAHOGA HEIGHTS, OHIO, CODE § 650
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-1
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-902
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402
W. VA. CODE § 61-16-2
GREENFIELD, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10.35
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-303

Laws That Limit What Images Drone Operators Can Capture
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-16-101(b), -102(b)
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8
BARSTOW, CAL., CODE § 9.66
BURBANK, CAL., CODE § 5-3-16-02
HERMOSA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.38.010 et seq.
MANHATTAN BEACH, CAL., CODE § 3.7.030
WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., CODE § 9.30.040
TELLURIDE, COLO., MUN. CODE §§ 10-11-10 et seq.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1334
BETHANY BEACH, DEL., CODE § 212-6(10)
FLA. STAT. § 934.50
AVENTURA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30.211
Defuniak Springs, Fla., Ordinance 866 (May 23, 2016)
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IDAHO CODE § 21-213
Ada County, Idaho, Ordinance 883 (May 15, 2018)
CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 10-36-400
ROLLING MEADOWS, ILL., CODE § 38-355
IND. CODE §§ 35-45-4-5, -10-6
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-31A02
PRAIRIE VILLAGE, KAN., CODE §§ 11-1601 et seq.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:63
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:283.1, .3
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:284
WEST MONROE, LA., CODE § 11-5017
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 259.322
EAST LANSING, MICH., CODE § 26-67
FLUSHING, MICH., CODE § 132.02(8)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61
LONG BEACH, N.J., CODE §§ 57-2, -3
HUNTINGTON, N.Y., CODE § 189
LAUREL HOLLOW, N.Y., CODE § 85-9
NORTHPORT, N.Y., CODE § 313
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-300.1
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.4-05
BOTTINEAU, N.D., CODE § 10.0902
CUYAHOGA HEIGHTS, OHIO, CODE § 650
NICHOLS HILLS, OKLA., CODE § 32-188
OR. REV. STAT. § 837.370
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.700
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3505
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-1
ABERDEEN, S.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10-2
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TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-903
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402
W. VA. CODE § 61-16-2
WIS. STAT. § 942.10
ELKHART LAKE, WIS., CODE § 26.05
GREENFIELD, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10.35
HUDSON, WIS., MUN. CODE § 187-20
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-303

Laws That Limit Drone Operations by Certain Classes of People
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1334
FLA. STAT. § 934.50
AVENTURA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30.211
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12.5
IND. CODE § 35-46-1-15.1
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:63
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 259.322
NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.103
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40-28
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3505
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-902
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-324.2
W. VA. CODE § 61-16-2

Laws That Limit the Flow and Uses of Drone Data
PARADISE VALLEY, ARIZ., TOWN CODE §§ 10-12-1 et seq.
BARSTOW, CAL., CODE § 9.60
HERMOSA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.38.010 et seq.
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MANHATTAN BEACH, CAL., CODE § 3.7.030
WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., CODE § 9.30.040
FLA. STAT. § 934.50
Defuniak Springs, Fla., Ordinance 866 (May 23, 2016)
IOWA CODE § 808.15
IDAHO CODE § 21-213
Ada County, Idaho, Ordinance 883 (May 15, 2018)
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/40
IND. CODE § 35-33-5-10
IND. CODE § 35-45-5-5
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283.3
SAINT BONIFACIUS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 91-01 et seq.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-109
NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.112
HUNTINGTON, N.Y., CODE § 189
LAUREL HOLLOW, N.Y., CODE § 85-9
NORTHPORT, N.Y., CODE § 313
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-300.1
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-29.4-02
CUYAHOGA HEIGHTS, OHIO, CODE § 650
OR. REV. STAT. § 837.320
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-905
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 423.004, .005
UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-14-203
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 4622
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